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ABSTRACT 
 
Questa tesi ha lo scopo di analizzare la riforma delle Banche di Credito Cooperativo in Italia 
emanata nel febbraio 2016 che prevede la riorganizzazione del credito cooperativo secondo il 
modello del gruppo bancario cooperativo regolato dal contratto di coesione. Nel primo capitolo 
viene analizzato il testo della Legge 14 Febbraio 2016 n. 18, TUB, considerandone i relativi 
effetti. Nel secondo capitolo vengono studiati i modelli di Crédit Agricole e Rabobank, 
considerati i principali gruppi bancari cooperativi in Europa che potrebbero essere considerati 
come esempi per la riforma delle BCC italiane. Nel terzo capitolo, vengono analizzati i principi 
finanziari che potrebbero rappresentare una guida per la redazione del contratto di coesione. I 
principi finanziari considerati sono quelli sui quali si basano alcune rilevanti istituzioni 
finanziarie, quali, il Fondo Interbancario di Tutela di Depositi, le Agenzie di Rating e quelli 
contenuti nei piani di recupero bancari redatti dall’European Banking Authority. Nel quarto 
capitolo vengono valutati i possibili scenari ai quali potrebbe portare lo sviluppo della riforma. 
In conclusione emerge che il contratto di coesione dovrebbe essere basato su un sistema di 
indicatori e misurazione dei rischi volto a monitorare l’adeguatezza patrimoniale, la liquiditá e 
la solvibilitá di ogni banca aderente al gruppo al fine di identificare tempestivamente situazioni 
di criticitá finanziaria. Per quanto riguarda il nuovo riassetto organizzativo del credito 
cooperativo italiano, un accordo definitivo non é ancora stato raggiunto, tuttavia attualmente la 
formazione di due gruppi bancari cooperativi sembra essere quella piú probabile. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mutual Banks have traditionally represented an important portion of the Italian banking 
business, with strong ties to local businesses. The Article 45 of the Italian Constitution 
recognizes the social function of the mutual sector, characterized by a mutual cooperation 
without goals of private speculation. 
In Italy two kinds of mutual banking systems are present, the Banche del Credito Cooperativo 
(BCCs) and the Banche Popolari. However, despite their common mutual nature, they have 
developed different characteristics through the years. While the Banche Popolari have 
progressively moved by their original nature, transforming themselves into joint-stock 
companies, the BCCs have always remained deeply rooted in the local territory of their 
competence maintaining their mutual features. 
In my thesis I will focus on the BCCs and on the current reform that aims to improve their 
structure considered no more suitable to survive in an always more complex financial landscape 
characterized by the consequences of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, by the evolution of the 
regulation and supervision systems and by the needs of change required by the technological 
progress. This situation is not different by the one faced by the whole banking system. However, 
the BCCs find themselves in a weak situation as their model of governance limits their capacity 
to increase their capital and the strong link to the local territory does not allow an adequate 
diversification level exposing the banks to high risks of financial distress. 
The Italian Credito Cooperativo is a system based on a network comprising 381 cooperative 
banks including Banche di Credito Cooperativo, Casse Rurali, Casse Raiffeisen in Alto Adige 
and several service companies, all working together to guarantee a complete and diversified 
range of products in accordance with their cooperative values. The associative structure is 
subdivided into three levels: local (BCCs), regional (Local Federations) and national 
(Federcasse). The individual BCCs are associated with the Local Federations (representing one 
or more regions) which in turn are members of Federcasse, the Italian Federation of BCCs. 
Federcasse represents and protects the rights of its associated banks, offering them legal, fiscal, 
and organizational assistance, providing also support in communications and training leading 
benefits to the entire Cooperative Credit system. 
The first Italian cooperative bank was Cassa Rurale di Loreggia founded in 1883 by Leone 
Wollemborg, in the province of Padova. During the fascist period many cooperative banks were 
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ordered to close. However, after the second Wold War, the advent of the Italian Republic and 
of the Italian Constitution have recognized the social role of the mutual cooperatives, 
relaunching Casse Rurali and Artigiane. In 1950 Federcasse (Federazione Italiana delle Casse 
Rurali e Artigiane), originally founded in 1909, was reformed and become a member of 
Confcooperative in 1967. Iccrea (Istituto di Credito delle Casse Rurali e Artigiane) was founded 
in 1963, with the goal of facilitating, coordinating and improving the activities of individual 
cooperative banks through financial intermediation and assistance. In 1993 the Casse Rurali e 
Artigiane changed their name into Banche di Credito Cooperativo (BCCs). In the same year the 
Consolidated Banking Law (Testo Unico Bancario) came into force, lifting the legal limitations 
which had previously governed the banking operations of cooperative banks. 
Nowadays, the BCCs reform is thought to provide a solution to the weaknesses of the 
cooperative sector to enforce BCCs and to enable them to compete at European level. The aim 
of this thesis is to analyse the current reform evaluating the effects of the new Law at structural 
and national level.  
In the first chapter I will analyse the text of the reform, the Law of 14th February 2016 N. 18, 
highlighting the main innovations introduced in the system and considering the main implied 
financial effects. In the second chapter I will study the two main European mutual banking 
groups: Crédit Agricole and Rabobank, deepening the mechanisms of their internal structure 
such as the cross-guarantee system and the regulation of the internal relationships between the 
holdings and individual member banks. Because of their success, these two models may provide 
a good example for the developing of the Italian reform. Following, in the third chapter I will 
analyse the principles used by some relevant financial institutions, such as rating agencies, the 
FITD, and the banks recovery plans provided by EBA, in order to determine the main financial 
principles that may represent a guide for the formation of the cohesion contract. After that, the 
fourth chapter aims to provide an analysis of the possible scenarios that could take place as a 
consequence of the reform. I will analyse the main consequences in the Italian system 
considering possible advantages and disadvantages, providing in conclusion my personal 
considerations about the emerged elements. 
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CHAPTER 1 – THE REFORM OF THE ITALIAN MUTUAL 
BANKS: ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW 
 
1.1 THE MUTUAL SECTOR AND THE BANCHE DI CREDITO 
COOPERATIVO: A COMPLEX FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE    
                                                                                      
The mutual credit covers a special role in the Italian banking system. The Article 45 of the 
Italian Constitution recognizes the social function of the mutual sector characterized by mutual 
cooperation without goals of private speculation. 
A relevant part of the Italian mutual sector is represented by the cooperative banks (BCCs)1 
considered “banche cooperative a mutualitá prevalente”.  
Their mutual nature is represented by two main aspects: 
 The principle of prevalence that recurs when more than the 50% of the risk activities, 
such as loans, are addressed to shareholders or to risk-free assets. 
 The earnings distribution. In accordance with the Art. 37 TUB2, the BCCs have to assign 
their profit for the 70% to legal reserves and for a further 3% to a mutual fund for the 
promotion and development of the cooperative sector. The remaining part of earnings 
has to be assigned to mutual and charity purposes. The legislation provides a limit for 
the dividend distribution to shareholders.  
Other aspects that characterize the BCCs are: 
 Economic democracy among shareholders. The minimum number of shareholders per 
BCC is 200 (in case this number decreases, new shareholders have to be reinstated 
within one year, otherwise the liquidation of the bank would start). The voting right 
principle is “one head one vote”. Every shareholder disposes of just one vote regardless 
of his participation amount that cannot exceed 50 thousand euro (in order to avoid 
disparities among shareholders that may hamper the mutual functions).  
                                                             
1 In English the expression “mutual banks” is referred to all the financial institutions part of the mutual sector 
without distinguishing between Popular Banks and Cooperative Banks. In this thesis both the expressions “mutual 
banks” and “cooperative banks” will be used in reference to the BCCs. 
2 Art. 37, TUB. Utili. 1.   Le   banche   di   credito   cooperativo   devono   destinare almeno il settanta per cento  
degli  utili   netti  annuali  a riserva legale. 2.  Una  quota  degli  utili  ne tti  annuali  deve  essere  corrisposta  ai  
fondi  mutualistici  per la promozione e lo sviluppo  della  cooperazione   nella   misura e con le modalità previste 
dalla legge. 3.  La  quota di utili  che  non  è assegnata  ai  sensi  dei  commi  precedenti e  che  non  è  utilizzata  
per  la rivalutazione  delle  azioni  o  assegnata  ad  altre  riserve  o  distribuita  ai  soci  deve  essere  destinata  a  
fini di  beneficenza o mutualità.   
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 Strong local presence. BCCs operate in a limited geographical and they provide their 
services for that territory, also called “territory of competence”. At least the 95% of their 
risk activities of each single BCC has to be exercised in its area of competence. Also 
BCCs’ shareholders are people and companies that work in that specific territory.  
Because of their nature, BCCs are subject either to the banking regulations that aim to protect 
savings and to ensure financial stability, either to regulations thought to protect their mutual 
values. 
As stated by the Art. 2 of the BCCs Corporate Statute, “the Bank aims to serve the interests of 
its stakeholders and members of the local community through the provision of financial 
operations and services, to improve their moral, cultural and economic conditions, promoting 
collaboration and teaching the benefits of saving and forward planning as well as encouraging 
social unity and responsible, sustainable growth in the surrounding territory. The Bank 
distinguishes itself through its support for the community and its commitment to further the 
common good.”    
Most cooperative banks have been designed to perpetually accumulate capital, building an 
always larger intergenerational endowment3. However, this structure appears to be inadequate 
to the current financial landscape characterized by financial troubles and instability caused by 
the financial crisis of the 2007-2008, by the evolution of the vigilance and supervision 
procedures and by the continuous needs of change required by the technological progress. In 
this scenario, BCCs find themselves caught between their capital-accumulating set-ups and 
pressures to increase their profitability. 
The main financial issues currently faced by BCCs regard: 
 Difficulties in raising capital: the cooperative governance framework combined with 
restricted voting rights makes raising capital particularly difficult, especially at the time 
of distress when financial resources are urgently needed. BCCs can only raise new 
cooperative capital by increasing their membership or by asking existing members to 
buy more shares. However, in time of difficulties, many members and clients may not 
be in a position to provide significant amounts of fresh capital. Indeed, members usually 
buy just the minimum number of shares needed to gain access to the benefits that derive 
from the cooperative’s activities without considering it as a financial investment (that 
                                                             
3   W. Fonteyne, July 2007, Cooperative Banks in Europe. “The capital of the cooperative banks is not owned by 
the current members but by the cooperative itself. The capital is available for use by current members, under the 
implicit or explicit understanding that they will grow it further and pass it on to the next generation of members.” 
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would bring very low dividends). Furthermore, often legal restrictions recur that limit 
the total value of shares a shareholder can hold. Another way to raise new capital may 
be represented by the issuance of particular securities but these tools would require high 
remuneration. Therefore, in both cases raising capital would be complex and time-
consuming. 
 Difficulties of adaptation to a changing environment: cooperative banks may have more 
difficulties adjusting to adverse circumstances as BCCs are usually based on high fixed 
costs and their rigid structure does not allow a fast reaction to external changes. 
 Agency problems: The cooperative governance structure limits shareholders control 
over management. The ‘one member-one vote’ principle and ownership limits result in 
owner-manager conflicts in accordance with the agency cost theory as small 
shareholders typically do not have the incentive to exert effective control over 
management. 
 Difficulties to implement expansionary paths: expansionary policies put significance 
pressure on cooperative’s solvency and liquidity. As new acquisitions (unless they have 
the form of mergers with larger institutions) cannot be financed through the issuance of 
new equity but they have to be paid through the issuance of new debt causing a 
deterioration in the balance-sheet. 
 
In many European Countries, in order to face these structural issues, cooperative banks have 
turned into commercial financial institutions losing their cooperative features to increase their 
capital access. However, many other Countries think that this is not the solution to the problem. 
This is the case of Italy that argues to support its cooperative banking system, aware of its 
relevant social role in the past and of the important contribution that it can still offer: to provide 
people with the tools and resources to collectively and individually help themselves.  
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1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE BCCs REFORM  
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, BCCs find themselves in a particularly weak position 
in the current financial context. Their governance structure limits their capacity to access to 
financial resources and the territorial constraints do not allow an adequate diversification level, 
bringing to higher risks. Because of that, BCCs had to increase their levels of coverage 
dramatically affecting their auto financing possibilities. This in turn has increased the exposure 
of BCCs to financial tensions because of their financial difficulties of increasing their capital in 
accordance with the measures and the speed of intervention required by the national and 
European regulations.  
In light of the elements considered in the previous paragraph, it seems to be necessary to support 
the mutual sector promoting a greater integration level.  
The increase of competition and the continuous technological progress represent a threat for the 
business model of the BCCs. Indeed high investments in technology and in modernization of 
distribution channels are needed but they could be possible only in presence of economies of 
scale.  
This appears to be far from the reality of BCCs that still operate with a traditional business 
model and with old distribution networks. Because of their small dimensions they are 
characterized by rigid cost structures that do not allow to increase the level of efficiency. Also 
the capital constraints regarding shareholders represent an obstacle to the recapitalization of 
BCCs.  
It seems clear that a reform of the BCCs is needed in order to adapt the structure of the Italian 
BCCs to the current financial landscape. In particular, the reform focuses on the improvement 
of the governance model and on the development of an efficient guarantee system. 
 
Governance  
As regards the governance, BCCs may benefit from the territorial feature as being close to the 
local communities would allow a better understanding of local requirements and therefore to 
improve the service provision. However, these advantages could recur only in presence of a 
healthy and prudent territorial link. Indeed several times conflicts of interests and local 
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influences have been observed that have affected decisions of investments and of credit 
allocation bringing to a loss of efficiency and to higher risks. 
These weaknesses related to the governance, may be solved by the formation of larger 
institutions such as banking groups. In order to align the Italian BCCs with the European 
evolution, the Bank of Italy has promoted a solution that aims to aggregate the Italian BCCs in 
one or more cooperative banking groups. Indeed, a cooperative banking group with a holding 
company that disposes of an adequate level of capital and able to access to capital markets can 
ensure support to BCCs in financial troubles. The relationships between the holding company 
and the member BCCs are regulated by the contract of cohesion that has the role to ensure the 
respect of the prudential requirements, the well-functioning and the cohesion of the group. A 
high integration level, an adequate capitalization level and the capacity to attract investors may 
create the basis for an increase in efficiency and in the quality of the governance of the single 
BCCs.  
Another important point is the democratization aspect. This involves a high involvement of 
shareholders in the decision-making process of the banks as they can offer a key contribution 
in the product, service and policies development. Building solid relationships with customers 
may represent a great form of value added for the bank. 
In sum, the governance has to ensure the development of a prudent and healthy management of 
the group, the efficiency of the internal control mechanisms and the respect of the prudential 
capital requirements of each member BCC. The contract of cohesion has to promote high and 
homogeneous quality standards within the group based on the evaluation of the competences 
of the member banks’ exponents and on the merit recognition.  
 
Cross-guarantee system 
Another relevant goal of the reform is to create an internal guarantee mechanism to allow to 
move financial resources throughout the group on the base of the individual needs of each 
member BCC.  
A cross-guarantee system has been introduced, in accordance to which member banks are 
required to intervene in solid. The interventions can be either in a vertical sense from the holding 
to the BCCs either in a horizontal sense among BCCs. In order to ensure the financial stability 
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of each single BCC the commitment of each bank is proportional to its patrimonial disposals 
and it is limited to the capital exceeding the individual capital requirements (free capital). 
The guarantee in solid of the group has a double function. An internal function of intra-group 
financial support in cases of insolvency or liquidity problems of member BCCs and an external 
one in favour of creditors in case of breach of the obligations of a member bank. 
The cross-guarantee scheme is regulated by the Art. 4 (127)4 of the CRR, that emphasises the 
prompt transfer of the financial resources from the committed BCCs to the holding. To allow 
resources to flow throughout the group, it is necessary to eliminate all the possible legislative 
constraints that may hamper the transition of the resources. Also, it is required the constitution 
ex ante of specific capital and liquidity buffers (in particular CET1) in order to ensure the 
prompt availability of the resources in accordance to the regulations. Each member bank issues 
financing shares that have to be subscribed by the holding to meet the early intervention 
measures.  
Each BCC will be asked to participate to the prompt available funds on the base of its Risk-
Weighted Assets (RWA) and of its free capital. It is estimated that, in the context of a group, 
the cross-guarantee system will increase the CET1 ratio of the BCCs in deficit from an average 
value of 10,1% to 12,3%.  
Regarding the subjects of the reform instead, we find the following bodies: 
 the holding company; 
 the provincial groups;  
 the territorial sub-groups. 
                                                             
4 Art. 4 (127), CRR. “Cross-guarantee scheme” means a scheme that meets all the following conditions: 
(a) the institutions fall within the same institutional protection scheme as referred to in Article 113(7); 
(b) the institutions are fully consolidated in accordance with Article 1(1)(b), (c) or (d) or Article 1(2) of Directive 
83/349/EEC and are included in the supervision on a consolidated basis of an institution which is a parent 
institution in a Member State in accordance with Part One, Title II, Chapter 2 of this Regulation and subject to 
own funds requirements; 
(c) the parent institution in a Member State and the subsidiaries are established in the same Member State and are 
subject to authorisation and supervision by the same competent authority; 
(d) the parent institution in a Member State and the subsidiaries have entered into a contractual or statutory liability 
arrangement which protects those institutions and in particular ensures their liquidity and solvency, in order to 
avoid bankruptcy in the case that it becomes necessary; 
(e) arrangements are in place to ensure the prompt provision of financial means in terms of capital and liquidity if 
required under the contractual or statutory liability arrangement referred to in point (d); 
(f) the adequacy of the arrangements referred to in points (d) and (e) is monitored on a regular basis by the 
competent authority; 
(g) the minimum period of notice for a voluntary exit of a subsidiary from the liability arrangement is 10 years; 
(h) the competent authority is empowered to prohibit a voluntary exit of a subsidiary from the liability arrangement; 
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Holding 
The holding is the main body of the group. It has a central role as it is required the enforcement 
of financial stability, competition, efficiency and healthy and prudent management of the 
member BCCs. In accordance with the Law 14th February 2016, n.18, the holding must have 
the following characteristics: 
 its legal basis is in Italy; 
 it has to be in form of S.p.A.; 
 it has to be authorized at the exercise of the banking activity in accordance with the Art. 
145  TUB; 
 its capital is owned for more than the 50% by the member BCCs; 
 its capital has to meet the 1 billion euro threshold; 
 it must disposes of organizational structures that allow the exercise of its direction and 
coordination activities and to ensure the access to the international banking procedures. 
The holding has to ensure the protection of the mutual principles of the single BCCs. Among 
the others, the main powers of the holding consist in: 
 the direction and coordination of the group; 
 the issuance of disposals for member BCCs and in the control their observation;  
 the monitoring of early warning indicators;  
 the corrective interventions in cases of deviation from the strategy; 
 the distribution of the advantages derived from the activities of the group; 
 operations of proportional sanctions. 
The holding is owned for the majority by the member BCCs that therefore can exercise their 
control over it. The other part of its capital instead is open to capital market investments. In this 
                                                             
5 Art. 14, TUB. Autorizzazione all'attività bancaria. 1.  La  Banca  d'Italia  autorizza  l'attività  bancaria quando  
ricorrano  le  seguenti  condizioni:  a) sia adottata la forma di società per azioni o di società cooperativa per azioni  
a  responsabilità  limitata ;   
a-bis) la  sede  legale  e  la  direzione  generale  siano  situate  nel  territorio della  Repubblica  
b) il capitale versato sia di ammontare non inferiore a quello determinato dalla Banca d'Italia;   
c) venga presentato un programma concernente l'attività   iniziale, unitamente all'atto costitutivo e allo  statuto;   
d) sussistano i presupposti per  il rilascio dell'autorizzazione   prevista  dall'articolo  19  per  i  titolari  delle  
partecipazioni  ivi  indicate;   
e) i  soggetti che svolgono funzioni di amministrazione, direzione e controllo siano idonei, ai sensi dell'articolo  
26;  
f) non  sussistano,  tra  la  banca  o  i  soggetti  del  gruppo  di  appartenenza  e  altri   soggetti,   stretti   legami   
che   ostacolino   l’effettivo   esercizio   delle   funzioni  di  vigilanza  .   
2.  La  Banca  d'Italia  nega  l'autorizzazione  quando  dalla  verifica  delle  condizioni  indicate  nel  comma  1  
non  risulti  garantita  la  sana  e  prudente  gestione.   
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way it can have access to higher amounts of financial resources strengthening the financial 
soundness of the group.  
Furthermore, the holding company is required to have organizational structures able to 
intermediate the BCCs with the capital markets and the relationship with the BCE regarding 
reserve requirements and operations of monetary policy. The capacity of the holding to provide 
technological and operational support to the member BCCs is an element of efficiency and 
competition of the CBG. Furthermore it represents an element of alignment to the other 
European Countries.  
Essential is also the capacity of the holding to exercise its powers of direction and coordination 
in full autonomy with its own structures. Only some secondary activities can be assigned to 
third parties. 
 
Provincial Groups 
Another figure present in the group is the ‘provincial group’ thought for BCCs that operate 
exclusively in the province of Trento and Bolzano.  
The provincial group is regulated in the following way: 
 the holding must have its legal basis in the province of Trento or Bolzano and it must 
have the form of S.p.A.; 
 the minimum capital requirement of the holding is equal to 250 million euro;  
 it must be authorized to the exercise of the banking activities in accordance with the Art. 
14 TUB; 
 the group can exercise its activities exclusively in the provincial territory of its 
competence. It is allowed the exercise external to the territory of competence only if 
they do not exceed the 5% of risk activities of each single bank. 
 
 
Territorial sub-groups 
Other subjects recognized by the reform are the ‘territorial sub-groups’. These groups are 
banking sub-systems that would be coordinated by a sub-holding. The territorial sub-groups 
would be formed (and included in the group) only in cases of necessity to establish a stronger 
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territorial link. Indeed, it could be made only by banks with legal basis within the same region. 
The minimum dimension required for the territorial sub-groups corresponds to at least the 10% 
of the total RWA of the BCCs part of the group. The sub-holding exercises support operations 
for the holding company coordinating and directing the member banks of the sub-group. 
 
The contract of cohesion 
The contract of cohesion must ensure the coherence of the strategy and of the operational 
objectives of the entire group together with the integration and efficiency of the systems of 
management and control of the whole group. 
The role of the holding company and the regulation of its powers appear to be of central 
importance in the contract. Indeed, throughout its activities, the holding has to enforce the 
financial stability of the member BCCs, guaranteeing high efficiency, competition and the 
protection of the mutual principles. Furthermore, it states the principles for the correct provision 
of the holding’s activities of direction and coordination in order to ensure a healthy and prudent 
management of the group. 
As regards the governance, the goal is to promote in every component of the group high quality 
standards based on the recognition of merits in order to guarantee a healthy and prudent 
management of the member BCCs without compromising their autonomy. To do that, the 
statutes of the member BCCs have to include in the regulation of the mechanisms of formation 
of the internal bodies a phase of consultancy, in which the holding expresses its opinions on the 
candidates. An analogue mechanism is provided for the revocation of the members. These 
powers are recognized to the holding by the Ar.t 37-bis TUB toward all the member BCCs. 
Regarding internal control systems, the holding has to implement the risk profile (Risk Appetite 
Framework – RAF6) and the methodologies of risk measurement at consolidated level.  All the 
internal control activities of the group including internal audit and risk assessment procedures 
development have to be assigned to the holding company. Furthermore, the holding has to 
verify the policies of risk management of the member BCCs. The internal control activities are 
based on a system of early warning indicators that allow to monitor the risks of the member 
BCCs and to guarantee the prompt provision of the intra group support measures.  
                                                             
6 RAF can be defined as the total impact of risk an organisation is prepared to accept in the pursuit of its strategic 
objectives (KPMG). 
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The holding has to issue dispositions about the following areas: 
 the whole process of granting of credit and the risk measurement; 
 the funding policies, determining in which measure each bank contributes to provide 
financial resources to the group and operations of risk and liquidity management; 
 the investment strategies and the management of the connected risks. 
The advantages derived from the activities of the group have to be distributed among member 
BCCs in relation to their performance. The banks in charge of higher guarantee commitments 
have to be compensated by an adequate level of advantages.  
 
Formation of the Cooperative Banking Group 
The first step of the procedure is to ensure the presence of all the elements required. The bank 
that intends to become the holding of the group must submit to the Bank of Italy an instance 
together with: 
 a scheme of the cohesion contract (already including the cross-guarantee scheme); 
 the list of the BCCs that intend to join the group and all their statutes. 
The Bank of Italy controls that all the elements meet the characteristics required by the law 
(TUB) regarding the exercise of the banking activities, capital thresholds and schemes of the 
cohesion contract and of the guarantee system suitable to ensure the prudent and healthy 
management of the group. 
 
Vigilance 
The holding is in charge to issue dispositions to ensure the respect of the prudential requirement 
of the group such as capital buffers, liquidity levels and the homogeneity of the methodologies 
of risk measurement of the whole group. The holding homogenises the criteria of the 
methodologies for the documents ICAAP prepared by each single BCC in order to ensure the 
reliability of the process of determination of the ICAAP of the group. The holding’s dispositions 
have to ensure also the respect of the other prudential regulations (such as transparency, internal 
controls and governance). Furthermore, in accordance to the Art. 61 comma 47, TUB, the 
                                                             
7 Art. 61 comma 4, TUB. La capogruppo, nell'esercizio dell'attività di direzione e di coordinamento, emana    
disposizioni alle componenti del gruppo per l'esecuzione delle istruzioni impartite dalla Banca d’Italia 
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holding has to ensure the execution of the instruction of the authority of vigilance, Banca 
d’Italia and it must also submit periodical reports and further information required for the 
formation of the consolidated balance sheet of the group.  
As the formation of the contract of cohesion is still under discussion, in the following chapters 
I will try to determine the financial and prudential principles on which the cohesion contract 
should be based. To do that, I will analyse the financial criteria used by other financial 
institutions such as the FITD, the rating agencies and by the banks’ recovery plans, trying to 
reach my own conclusions. 
  
                                                             
nell’interesse della stabilità del gruppo.  Gli  amministratori  delle  società  del  gruppo  sono tenuti  a fornire ogni 
dato e informazione per  l'emanazione delle disposizioni  e  la  necessaria collaborazione per il rispetto delle norme 
sulla vigilanza consolidata. 
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1.3 ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 14th FEBRUARY 2016, N. 18 
  
The new financial scenario followed by the global financial problems has put in strain the Italian 
banking system with the risk of failure of the major Italian mutual banks.   
To face this situation of emergency, the Italian government has issued a specific decree-law 
putting particular emphasis on mutual banks governance reforms.  
As we have seen in the previous paragraph, the aim of the reform is to re-organize the Italian 
BCCs in a cooperative banking group under the direction and control of a holding company. In 
this way, the BCCs would see their financial position strengthen. Indeed, the large size of the 
group would allow them to have access to higher amounts of financial resources. Therefore, 
their financial soundness would increase and the cross-guarantee system would allow a high 
and fast mobility of financial resources throughout the group to support the member BCCs in 
financial troubles.  
The Law n. 18 was issued as a decree-law by the government the 14th February 2016 and was 
approved by the Italian parliament the 25th March 2016. 
It is structured in four main parts called “Capo I”, “Capo II”, “Capo III” and “Capo IV”.  
Following, I will analyse the Law providing an overview of the whole regulation and deepening 
in particular the Capo I as it regards the main focus of the thesis: the formation and the functions 
of the Cooperative Banking Group. 
 
Capo I 
The Article 1 explains all the amendments to the Law 1st September 1993, n. 385 (Testo Unico 
Bancario).  
In particular, through the amendments provided to the Article 37-bis of the Law 1st September 
1993, n.385, it introduces the concept of “Cooperative Banking Group” (Gruppo Bancario 
Cooperativo).  
It is highlighted the role of the holding company that controls and coordinates the activities and 
functions of the other banks part of the group. The holding company must have the form of 
S.p.A. and a capital of minimum one billion euro. Its capital is owned for the majority by the 
BCCs part of the group. 
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The relations between the holding and the member BCCs are regulated by the “Cohesion 
Contract” that indicates the holding company in charge of the direction of the group and 
regulates its powers. Among the others, the main powers of the holding include:  
 the development of the strategic activities of the group;  
 the development of coordination and control functions in order to ensure the respect of 
the financial prudential requirements provided by the banking and financial law for the 
cooperative banking group; 
 the cases in which the holding can nominate or revoke a component of the group; 
 the exclusion of a BCC from the group in case it does not respect the measures provided 
by the cohesion contract; 
 the criteria of compensation and distribution of the advantages arising from the activities 
of the group; 
 the conditions of adherence to the contract other than the conditions of exclusion from 
the group.  
The statute of the holding has to indicate the maximum number of shares (with 
corresponding voting rights) that can be owned by each shareholder. Furthermore, the 
contract must establish a cross-guarantee system in accordance to which, the BCCs 
guarantee in solid the obligations subscribed by the holding. 
The acceptance or rejection of the requests of adhesion, or the exclusion of a single BCC 
from the group has to be authorized by the Bank of Italy that has to control that the 
prudential financial constraints are maintained. 
Another aspect regards the role of the Minister of Economic and Finance. The Article 37-
bis recognizes his power to take measures to ensure the organizational and dimensional 
adequacy of the group. With the authorization of the Bank of Italy, the Minister can issue a 
decree-law to establish the minimum number of member BCCs of the group and he can 
establish different patrimonial participation levels of the BCCs in order to ensure the 
stability of the group. Moreover, he can provide the modalities to protect the different 
cultural features of the BCCs of the territory of Trento and Bolzano. 
The Bank of Italy covers a role of vigilance as it ensures the prudent management and 
efficiency of the group, in particular with reference to the minimum organizational and 
operational requirements of the holding, the minimum content of the cohesion contract and 
the minimum patrimonial requirements of each single member BCC. 
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“Art. 1 
Modifiche al decreto legislativo 1° settembre 1993, n. 385 
"Art. 37-bis 
Gruppo Bancario Cooperativo 
    1. Il gruppo bancario cooperativo e' composto da:  
   a) una societa' capogruppo costituita in forma di societa'  per azioni e autorizzat all'esercizio  
dell'attivita'  bancaria  il  cui capitale e' detenuto in misura maggioritaria dalle banche di  
credito cooperativo  appartenenti  al  gruppo,  che  esercita  attivita'   di direzione e 
coordinamento sulle societa' del gruppo sulla base di  un contratto conforme  a  quanto previsto  
dal  comma  38  del  presente articolo.  Il  medesimo  contratto  assicura   l'esistenza   di   una 
situazione  di  controllo  come  definito  dai   principi   contabili internazionali adottati 
dall'Unione europea; il requisito  minimo  di patrimonio netto della societa' capogruppo e' di 
un miliardo di euro; 
  b) le banche di credito cooperativo che aderiscono al contratto e hanno adottato le connesse 
clausole statutarie; 
  c) le societa' bancarie, finanziarie e strumentali  controllate dalla capogruppo, come definite 
dall'articolo 599.  
                                                             
8 Art. 37-bis comma 3, Law 14th February 2016, n.18, TUB. Il contratto di coesione che  disciplina  la  direzione  
e  il coordinamento della capogruppo sul gruppo indica:  
a) la banca capogruppo, cui e' attribuita  la  direzione  e  il coordinamento del gruppo; b) i poteri della capogruppo 
che, nel rispetto delle  finalita' mutualistiche, includono: 1) l'individuazione e l'attuazione degli indirizzi strategici 
ed obiettivi operativi del gruppo nonche' gli altri poteri  necessari per l'attivita' di  direzione  e  coordinamento,  
proporzionati  alla rischiosita' delle banche aderenti, ivi compresi  i  controlli  ed  i poteri di influenza sulle banche  
aderenti  volti  ad  assicurare  il rispetto dei requisiti prudenziali  e  delle  altre  disposizioni  in materia bancaria e  
finanziaria  applicabili  al  gruppo  e  ai  suoi componenti; 2) i casi,  comunque  motivati  ed  eccezionali,  in  cui  
la capogruppo puo', rispettivamente, nominare,  opporsi  alla  nomina  o revocare uno o piu' componenti, fino a 
concorrenza della maggioranza, degli organi di amministrazione e controllo delle  societa'  aderenti al gruppo e le 
modalita' di esercizio di tali poteri; 3) l'esclusione di una banca dal  gruppo  in  caso  di  gravi violazioni degli 
obblighi previsti dal contratto e  le  altre  misure sanzionatorie graduate in relazione alla gravita' della violazione. 
9 Articolo 59, TUB. Vigilanza su base consolidata. 1. Ai fini  del presente capo: a) il controllo sussiste nei casi 
previsti dall’articol 23 (1) ;  b) per  “società  finanziarie”  si  intendono  le  società  che  esercitano,  in  via  esclusiva  
o  prevalente:  l'attività  di  assunzione  di  partecipazioni  aventi  le  caratteristiche  indicate  dalla  Banca  d'Italia;  
una  o  più  delle  attività  previste  dall’articolo 1,   comma 2, lettera f),   numeri   da   2   a   12;   altre   attività   
finanziarie   previste   ai   sensi   del   numero   15   della   medesima   lettera;   le   attività  di  cui  all’articolo  1,  
comma  1,  lettera  n), del  decreto  legislativo  24  febbraio  1998,  n. 58  (2);  b-bis) per  “di  partecipazione  
finanziaria  mista”  si  intendono  le  società  di  cui  all’articolo  1, comma  1,  lettera  v),  del  decreto  legislativo  
30  maggio 2005,  n. 142 (3); c) per  “società  strumentali”  si intendono  le  società  che  esercitano,  in  via  
esclusiva  o  prevalente,  attività  che  hanno  carattere  ausiliario  de ll' a ttività   delle   società   del   gruppo,   
comprese   quelle   consistenti   nella   proprietà   e   nell' amministrazione  di immobili e nella  ge s tione di servizi 
anche informatici. 
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 c-bis) eventuali sottogruppi territoriali facenti capo a  una banca costituita  in  forma  di  
societa'  per  azioni  sottoposta  a direzione e coordinamento della capogruppo di cui alla 
lettera  a)  e composti dalle altre societa' di cui alle lettere b) e c).  
   1-bis. Le banche di  credito  cooperativo  aventi  sede  legale nelle  province   autonome   di   
Trento   e   di   Bolzano   possono rispettivamente  costituire  autonomi  gruppi   bancari   
cooperativi composti solo da banche aventi sede e operanti  esclusivamente  nella medesima  
provincia  autonoma,  tra  cui  la   corrispondente   banca capogruppo, la quale adotta una 
delle forme di cui  all'articolo  14, comma 1, lettera a)10; il  requisito  minimo  di  patrimonio  
netto e' stabilito dalla Banca d'Italia ai sensi del comma 7-bis11. 
2. Lo statuto della capogruppo indica  il  numero  massimo  delle azioni con diritto di voto che 
possono  essere  detenute  da  ciascun socio, direttamente o  indirettamente,  ai  sensi  
dell'articolo  22, comma 1 (TUB)12.  
3. Il contratto di coesione che  disciplina  la  direzione  e  il coordinamento della capogruppo 
sul gruppo indica:  
      a) la banca capogruppo, cui e' attribuita  la  direzione  e  il coordinamento del gruppo;  
      b) i poteri della capogruppo che, nel rispetto delle  finalita' mutualistiche, includono:  
        1) l'individuazione e l'attuazione degli indirizzi strategici ed obiettivi operativi del gruppo 
nonche' gli altri poteri  necessari per l'attivita' di  direzione  e  coordinamento,  proporzionati  
alla rischiosita' delle banche aderenti, ivi compresi  i  controlli  ed  i poteri di influenza sulle 
banche  aderenti  volti  ad  assicurare  il rispetto dei requisiti prudenziali  e  delle  altre  
disposizioni  in materia bancaria e  finanziaria  applicabili  al  gruppo  e  ai  suoi componenti;  
        2) i casi,  comunque  motivati  ed  eccezionali,  in  cui  la capogruppo puo', rispettivamente, 
nominare,  opporsi  alla  nomina  o revocare uno o piu' componenti, fino a concorrenza della 
                                                             
10 Art. 14, TUB. Autorizzazione all'attività Bancaria. 1.  La  Banca  d'Italia  autorizza  l'attività  bancaria  quando  
ricorrano  le  seguenti  condizioni:  a) sia adottata la forma di società per azioni o di società cooperativa per azioni 
a responsabilità limitata. 
11 Art. 37-bis, comma 7-bis, Law 14th February 2016, n. 18, TUB. La Banca  d'Italia,  al  fine  di  assicurare  la  
sana  e prudente  gestione,  la  competitivita'  e  l'efficienza  del  gruppo bancario  cooperativo,  nel  rispetto  della  
disciplina  prudenziale applicabile e delle finalita' mutualistiche,  detta  disposizioni  di attuazione  del  presente  
articolo  e  dell'articolo   37-ter,   con particolare riferimento: c) ai  requisiti  specifici,  compreso  il  requisito  
minimo  dipatrimonio  netto  della  capogruppo,  relativi  ai  gruppi   bancari cooperativi previsti dal comma 1-bis. 
12 Articolo 22 comma 1, TUB. Partecipazioni indirette e acquisti di concerto. 1.  Ai  fini  dell'applicazione  dei  
capi  III  e  IV  del  presente  Titolo  si  considerano  anche  le  partecipazioni  acquisite  o  comunque  possedute  
per  il  tramite di società controllate,  di società fiduciarie o per interposta persona. 
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maggioranza, degli organi di amministrazione e controllo delle  societa'  aderenti al gruppo e 
le modalita' di esercizio di tali poteri;  
        3) l'esclusione di una banca dal  gruppo  in  caso  di  gravi violazioni degli obblighi previsti 
dal contratto e  le  altre  misure sanzionatorie graduate in relazione alla gravita' della 
violazione;  
      c)  i   criteri   di   compensazione   e   l'equilibrio   nella distribuzione dei vantaggi derivanti 
dall'attivita' comune;  
      d)  i  criteri  e  le  condizioni  di  adesione,   di   diniego all'adesione nonche' di esclusione 
dal gruppo,  secondo  criteri  non discriminatori in linea con  il  principio  di  solidarieta'  tra  
le banche cooperative a mutualita'  prevalente.  Non  e'  in  ogni  caso ammesso il recesso.  
  4. Il contratto di cui al comma 3 prevede la garanzia  in  solido delle obbligazioni assunte 
dalla  capogruppo  e  dalle  altre  banche aderenti,  nel  rispetto  della  disciplina  prudenziale  
dei  gruppi bancari e delle singole banche aderenti. 
5.  L'adesione,  il  rigetto  delle  richieste  di   adesione   e l'esclusione di una banca di  credito  
cooperativo  sono  autorizzati dalla Banca d'Italia avendo riguardo alla sana  e  prudente  
gestionedel gruppo e della singola banca. 
... 
7. Il Ministro  dell'economia  e  delle  finanze,  al  fine  di assicurare l'adeguatezza  dimensionale  
e  organizzativa  del  gruppo bancario cooperativo, puo' stabilire con proprio decreto, sentita  
la Banca d'Italia:  
      a) il numero minimo di banche  di  credito  cooperativo  di  un gruppo bancario cooperativo;  
      b)  una  soglia  di  partecipazione  delle  banche  di  credito cooperativo al capitale della 
societa' capogruppo diversa  da  quella indicata al comma 1, lettera  a),  tenuto  conto  delle  
esigenze  di stabilita' del gruppo;  
      c) le modalita' e i criteri per assicurare il riconoscimento  e la salvaguardia delle 
peculiarita'  linguistiche  e  culturali  delle banche di credito cooperativo aventi  sede  legale  
nelle  regioni  a statuto speciale e nelle province autonome di Trento e di Bolzano.  
    7-bis. La Banca  d'Italia,  al  fine  di  assicurare  la  sana  e prudente  gestione,  la  
competitivita'  e  l'efficienza  del  gruppo bancario  cooperativo,  nel  rispetto  della  disciplina  
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prudenziale applicabile e delle finalita' mutualistiche,  detta  disposizioni  di attuazione  del  
presente  articolo  e  dell'articolo   37-ter,   con particolare riferimento:  
    a)  ai  requisiti  minimi   organizzativi   e   operativi   della capogruppo;  
    b) al contenuto minimo del contratto di  cui  al  comma  313,  alle caratteristiche della 
garanzia di cui al comma 414, al procedimento per la costituzione del gruppo e all'adesione al 
medesimo;  
    c) ai  requisiti  specifici,  compreso  il  requisito  minimo  di patrimonio  netto  della  
capogruppo,  relativi  ai  gruppi   bancari cooperativi previsti dal comma 1-bis15. 
Following, the amendments to the Article 37-ter of the Law 1st September 1993, n.385 regulate 
the formation of the cooperative banking group. The bank that aims to cover the role of holding 
company must submit to the Bank of Italy a scheme of the cohesion contract in accordance with 
the Article 37-bis together with a list of the BCCs that want to join the group. 
The Bank of Italy controls that all the requirements provided by the Article 37-bis are met. In 
particular, it checks the adequacy of the patrimonial level of the group required for the 
prudential management of the group. 
Once the controls of the Bank of Italy have been developed, the BCCs can sign the cohesion 
contract with the holding in accordance with the Article 37-bis. 
Then, the cohesion contract is transmitted to the Bank of Italy that registers the group in the 
specific groups register. 
 
 
 
                                                             
13 Art. 37-bis, comma 3, Law 14th February 2016, TUB. L'esclusione di una banca dal  gruppo  in  caso  di  gravi 
violazioni degli obblighi previsti dal contratto e  le  altre  misure sanzionatorie graduate in relazione alla gravita' 
della violazione. 
14   Art. 37-bis, comma 4, Law 14th February 2016. Il contratto di cui al comma 3 prevede la garanzia  in  solido 
delle obbligazioni assunte dalla  capogruppo  e  dalle  altre  banche aderenti,  nel  rispetto  della  disciplina  
prudenziale  dei  gruppi bancari e delle singole banche aderenti. 
15 Art. 37-bis, comma 1-bis, Law 14th February 2016. Le banche di  credito  cooperativo  aventi  sede  legale nelle  
province   autonome   di   Trento   e   di   Bolzano   possono rispettivamente  costituire  autonomi  gruppi   bancari   
cooperativi composti solo da banche aventi sede e operanti  esclusivamente  nella medesima  provincia  autonoma,  
tra  cui  la   corrispondente   banca capogruppo, la quale adotta una delle forme di cui  all'articolo  14, comma 1, 
lettera a); il  requisito  minimo  di  patrimonio  netto  e'stabilito dalla Banca d'Italia ai sensi del comma 7-bis. 
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“Art. 37-ter 
Costituzione del gruppo bancario cooperativo 
1. La banca che intenda assumere il ruolo di capogruppo ai  sensi dell'articolo 37-bis, comma 
1,  lettera  a),  trasmette  alla  Banca d'Italia:  
a) uno schema di contratto conforme a quanto stabilito ai sensi dell'articolo 37-bis;  
b) un elenco delle banche di credito cooperativo e delle  altre societa' che intendono aderire al 
gruppo bancario cooperativo.  
    2. La Banca d'Italia  accerta  la  sussistenza  delle  condizioni previste ai sensi dell'articolo 
37-bis e, in particolare, il grado di adeguatezza patrimoniale e finanziaria del gruppo e  
l'idoneita'  del contratto a consentire la sana e prudente gestione del gruppo.  
    3. A seguito dell'accertamento previsto dal comma 2, le banche di credito ((cooperativo)) 
stipulano con la capogruppo il  contratto  di cui  all'articolo  37-bis  e  provvedono  alle  
necessarie  modifiche statutarie,  che  sono  approvate   con   le   maggioranze   previste 
dall'articolo 31, comma 1”. 
The Article 2 states the enactments that a cooperative bank has to follow in order to join a 
Cooperative Group or to become the holding company. Legal terms, deadlines, required 
documentation and procedures are explained. Within 90 days from the inscription of the group 
in the groups register (from the Bank of Italy), a BCC can ask to join the group at the same 
conditions of the other BCCs. The holding communicates the acceptance or rejection of the 
request within 30 days from its reception. If the holding does not provide any answer, the 
request is considered accepted. In case of rejection, an answer of the holding is sent to the BCC 
and to the Bank of Italy (in accordance to the Article 37-bis, comma 5 of the Law 1st September 
1993, n. 385) explaining the reasons of its decision. 
The Law leaves open a way out for the BCCs that decide to do not join the cooperative banking 
group. These BCCs have to assume the form of S.p.A. (individually or even jointly with other 
BCCs) authorized to the exercise of the banking activity. At the moment of the formation of the 
new society, the BCC has to pay to the State an amount of money equal to the 20% of its capital 
at the 31st December 2015. After that, the BCC has to modify its corporate object in order to 
exclude the exercise of the banking activity and to maintain just the mutual functions. In case 
the BCC does not obtain the authorization to form another S.p.A. independent from the group, 
the BCC is obliged to join an already existing cooperative group within the following 90 days. 
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“Art. 2 
Disposizioni attuative 
1...la  comunicazione  di  cui  all'articolo  37-ter, comma 116, e' inviata alla Banca d'Italia entro 
18 mesi dall'entrata in vigore delle disposizioni  emanate  ai  sensi  dell'articolo  37-bis, 
((commi 7 e 7-bis))17, del decreto legislativo 1°  settembre  1993,  n. 385.  
2... entro 90 giorni dall'iscrizione nel registro  delle  imprese  di cui al comma  418  dell'articolo 
37-ter  del  decreto  legislativo  1° settembre 1993,  n.  385,  una  banca  di  credito  cooperativo  
puo' chiedere di aderire a un gruppo  costituito  ai  sensi  dell'articolo 37-bis alle medesime 
condizioni previste per gli aderenti  originari. L'organo  amministrativo  della  capogruppo,  
sentito   l'organo   di controllo, comunica alla richiedente la deliberazione  assunta  entro 30 
giorni dal ricevimento della  domanda  di  adesione.  In  caso  di mancata risposta nel termine 
previsto la domanda si ha  per  accolta.   
In caso di diniego dell'adesione, la decisione e le motivazioni,  nel rispetto di quanto previsto 
dall'articolo 37-bis,  comma  3,  lettera d)19, poste a base della delibera,  sono comunicate  
dalla  capogruppo alla   banca   richiedente   e   alla   Banca   d'Italia   ai    fini 
dell'autorizzazione  prevista  dall'articolo  37-bis,  comma  520,  del decreto legislativo 1° 
                                                             
16 Art. 37-ter comma 1, Law 14th February 2016, n.18, TUB. 1. La banca che intenda assumere il ruolo di 
capogruppo ai  sensi dell'articolo 37-bis, comma  1,  lettera  a),  trasmette  alla  Banca d'Italia:a) uno schema di 
contratto conforme a quanto stabilito ai sensi dell'articolo 37-bis; b) un elenco delle banche di credito cooperativo 
e delle  altre societa' che intendono aderire al gruppo bancario cooperativo.  
17  Art. 37-bis, comma 7 and 7-bis, Law 14th February 2016, n.18, TUB. 7. Il Ministro  dell'economia  e  delle  
finanze,  al  fine  di assicurare l'adeguatezza  dimensionale  e  organizzativa del gruppo bancario cooperativo, puo' 
stabilire con proprio decreto, sentita  la Banca d'Italia: a) il numero minimo di banche di credito cooperativo di  un  
gruppo bancario cooperativo; b) una soglia di partecipazione delle banche di credito cooperativo al capitale della 
societa' capogruppo diversa da quella  indicata  al comma 1, lettera a), tenuto conto delle esigenze  di  stabilita'  
del gruppo; c) le modalita' e i criteri per assicurare il riconoscimento e la salvaguardia delle peculiarita' linguistiche 
e culturali delle banche di credito cooperativo aventi sede legale nelle  regioni  a  statuto speciale e nelle province 
autonome di Trento e di Bolzano.  
  7-bis. La Banca d'Italia, al fine di assicurare la sana e prudente gestione, la competitivita' e l'efficienza  del  gruppo  
bancario cooperativo, nel rispetto della disciplina prudenziale applicabile  e delle finalita' mutualistiche, detta 
disposizioni di  attuazione del presente articolo e dell'articolo 37-ter, con  particolare riferimento: a) ai requisiti 
minimi organizzativi e operativi della capogruppo; b) al contenuto minimo del  contratto  di  cui  al  comma  3,  
alle caratteristiche della garanzia di cui al comma 4, al procedimento per la costituzione del gruppo e all'adesione 
al medesimo; c)  ai  requisiti  specifici, compreso  il  requisito  minimo   di patrimonio  netto  della  capogruppo,  
relativi  ai  gruppi   bancari cooperativi previsti dal comma 1-bis. 
18 Art. 37-ter comma 4, Law 14th February 2016, n.18, TUB. 4. Il contratto e' trasmesso alla Banca d'Italia, che  
provvede all'iscrizione del gruppo nell'albo dei gruppi.  Successivamente,  si da'  corso  all'iscrizione  nel  registro  
delle  imprese  ai  sensi dell'articolo 2497-bis, secondo comma, del codice civile". 
19 Art. 37-bis, cooma 3, Law 14th February 2016, n.18. 3. d)  i  criteri  e  le  condizioni  di  adesione, di diniego 
all'adesione nonche' di esclusione dal gruppo,  secondo  criteri  non discriminatori in linea con  il  principio  di  
solidarieta'  tra  le banche cooperative a mutualita'  prevalente.  Non e' in  ogni  caso ammesso il recesso. 
20 Art. 37-bis, comma 5, Law 14th February 2016, n.18.  L'adesione,  il  rigetto  delle  richieste  di  adesione  e 
l'esclusione di una banca di  credito  cooperativo  sono  autorizzati dalla Banca d'Italia avendo riguardo alla sana  
e  prudente  gestionedel gruppo e della singola banca. 
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settembre 1993, n. 385. Nei  casi  di  cui  al presente comma,  la  richiesta  di  adesione  a  un  
gruppo  bancario cooperativo si ha per accolta qualora la banca di credito cooperativo abbia 
in precedenza fatto parte  di  un  accordo  di  responsabilita'contrattuale che tuteli tutte le parti 
aderenti ed,  in  particolare,garantisca la loro liquidita' e solvibilita'.  
3. Le banche  di  credito  cooperativo  autorizzate  alla  data  di entrata in vigore delle 
disposizioni emanate ai  sensi  dell'articolo 37-bis, (commi 7 e 7-bis)21, del  decreto  legislativo  
1°  settembre 1993, n. 385, che non aderiscono a un  gruppo  bancario  cooperativo,assumono 
le  deliberazioni  previste  dall'articolo  3622  del  decreto legislativo 1° settembre 1993, n. 385, 
o deliberano la liquidazione  entro il termine indicato ai commi 1 e 223 (del presente  articolo).  
Resta fermo quanto previsto dall'articolo 150-bis,  comma  524,  del  decreto legislativo 1° 
settembre 1993, n. 385, come modificato  dal  presente decreto.  
3-bis. In deroga a quanto previsto dall'articolo  150-bis,  comma 5, del decreto legislativo 1º 
settembre 1993, n. 385, la  devoluzione non si produce per  le  banche  di  credito  cooperativo  
che,  entro sessanta giorni dalla data  di  entrata  in  vigore  della  legge  di conversione del 
                                                             
21 Art. 37-bis, comma 7 and 7-bis, Law 14th February 2016, n.18, TUB.7. Il  Ministro  dell'economia  e  delle  
finanze,  al  fine  di assicurare l'adeguatezza  dimensionale  e  organizzativa  del  gruppo bancario cooperativo, 
puo' stabilire con proprio decreto, sentita  la Banca d'Italia: a) il numero minimo di banche di credito cooperativo 
di  un  gruppo bancario cooperativo; b) una soglia di partecipazione delle banche di credito cooperativo al capitale 
della societa' capogruppo diversa da quella  indicata  al comma 1, lettera a), tenuto conto delle esigenze  di  stabilita'  
del gruppo; c) le modalita' e i criteri per assicurare il riconoscimento  e  la salvaguardia delle peculiarita' 
linguistiche e culturali delle banche di credito cooperativo aventi sede legale  nelle  regioni  a  statuto speciale e 
nelle province autonome di Trento e di Bolzano. 7-bis. La Banca d'Italia, al fine di assicurare la sana e  prudente 
gestione,  la  competitivita'  e  l'efficienza  del  gruppo bancario cooperativo, nel rispetto della disciplina prudenziale 
applicabile  e delle finalita' mutualistiche, detta disposizioni di  attuazione del presente articolo e  dell'articolo  37-
ter,   con   particolare riferimento: a) ai requisiti minimi organizzativi e operativi della capogruppo; b) al contenuto 
minimo del  contratto  di  cui  al  comma  3,  alle caratteristiche della garanzia di cui al comma 4, al procedimento 
per la costituzione del gruppo e all'adesione al medesimo; c)  ai  requisiti  specifici,  compreso  il  requisito  minimo   
di patrimonio  netto  della  capogruppo,  relativi  ai  gruppi   bancari cooperativi previsti dal comma 1-bis. 
22  Art. 36 Law 1st September 1993, n.385, TUB. Fusioni e trasformazioni. 1. La Banca d’Italia autorizza, 
nell’interesse dei creditori e qualora sussistano ragioni di stabilita’, fusioni tra banche di credito cooperativo e 
banche  di  diversa  natura da  cui  risultino  banche  costituite  in  forma di  società per azioni.  
1-bis. In caso di recesso o  esclusione da un gruppo bancario  cooperativo, la banca  di  credito cooperativo,  entro  
il  termine  stabilito  con le disposizioni di cui all’articolo 37-bis, comma 7, previa  autorizzazione  rilasciata dalla 
Banca d’Italia avendo riguardo alla sana e prudente gestione della  banca,  può  deliberare la  propria  
trasformazione  in  società  per  azioni.  In mancanza, la società delibera la propria liquidazione. 
23 Art. 2, comma 1, 2, Law 14th February 2016, n.18, TUB. 1. La  comunicazione  di  cui  all'articolo  37-ter, 
comma 1, e' inviata alla Banca d'Italia entro 18 mesi dall'entrata in vigore delle disposizioni  emanate ai  sensi  
dell'articolo  37-bis, (commi 7 e 7-bis), del decreto legislativo 1°  settembre  1993,  n. 385. 2. Entro 90 giorni 
dall'iscrizione nel registro  delle  imprese  di cui al comma 4  dell'articolo  37-ter  del  decreto legislativo 1° 
settembre 1993,  n.  385,  una  banca  di  credito  cooperativo puo' chiedere di aderire a un gruppo  costituito  ai  
sensi  dell'articolo 37-bis alle medesime condizioni previste per gli aderenti  originari. L'organo amministrativo  
della  capogruppo,  sentito   l'organo di controllo, comunica alla richiedente la deliberazione  assunta  entro 30 
giorni dal ricevimento della  domanda di  adesione. 
24 Art. 150-bis, comma 5, TUB. Nei  casi  di   fusione  e   trasformazione   previsti   dall’articolo   36, nonché  di  
cessione  di  rapporti giuridici  in  blocco  e  scissione  da  cui  risulti  una  banca  costituita  in  forma  di  società  
per  azioni,  restano  fermi  gli  effetti  di   devoluzione  del patrimonio stabiliti  dall’ articolo 17  della legge  23   
dicembre 2000,  n. 388. 
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presente decreto, presentino alla Banca d'Italia, ai sensi dell'articolo 58 25  del  decreto  
legislativo  n.  385  del  1993, istanza, anche congiunta, di conferimento  delle  rispettive  
aziende bancarie  ad  una  medesima  societa'  per  azioni,  anche  di  nuova costituzione,  
autorizzata  all'esercizio  dell'attivita'   bancaria, purche' la banca istante o, in caso di istanza 
congiunta, almeno  una delle banche istanti possieda, alla data del  31  dicembre  2015,  un 
patrimonio  netto  superiore  a  duecento  milioni  di   euro,   come risultante dal bilancio 
riferito a tale  data,  su  cui  il  revisore contabile ha espresso un giudizio senza rilievi.  
 3-ter. All'atto del conferimento, la banca di  credito  cooperativo conferente versa al bilancio 
dello Stato un importo pari  al  20  per cento del patrimonio netto al 31 dicembre 2015, come  
risultante  dal bilancio riferito a tale  data,  su  cui  il  revisore  contabile  ha espresso un 
giudizio senza rilievi.  
  3-quater.  A  seguito  del  conferimento,  la  banca   di   credito cooperativo conferente, che 
mantiene le riserve indivisibili al netto del versamento di cui al comma 3-ter,  modifica  il  
proprio  oggetto sociale  per  escludere  l'esercizio  dell'attivita'  bancaria  e  si obbliga a 
mantenere le clausole  mutualistiche  di  cui  all'articolo 251426 del  codice  civile,  nonche'  ad  
assicurare  ai  soci  servizi funzionali al mantenimento del rapporto con la  societa'  per  azioni 
conferitaria, di formazione e informazione sui temi del  risparmio  e di promozione di 
                                                             
25 Art. 58, Law 1st September 1993, n.385, TUB. Cessione di Rapporti Giuridici. 1.  La Banca  d'Italia  emana  
istruzioni  per  la  cessione  a  banche  di  aziende,   di   rami   d'azienda,  di   beni  e  rapporti   giuridici   individuabili   
in  blocco.  Le  istruzioni  possono  prevedere  che  le  operazioni  di  maggiore  rilevanza  siano  sottoposte  ad  
autorizzazione   della  Banca  d'Italia. 2. La banca cessionaria dà notizia dell'avvenuta cessione mediante iscrizione   
nel   registro   delle   imprese  e pubblicazione nella Gazzetta  Ufficiale  della  Repubblica  italiana.  La  Banca  
d'Italia  può  stabilire  forme integrative  di  pubblicità.  3. I  privilegi  e  le  garanzie  di  qualsiasi  tipo,  da  
chiunque  prestati  o  comunque  esistenti  a  favore  del  cedente,  nonché  le  trascrizioni  nei  pubblici registri   
degli   atti   di   acquisto   dei   beni   oggetto di locazione   finanziaria  compresi  nella  cessione  conservano  la  
loro  validità  e  il  loro  grado  a  favore  del  cessionario,  senza  bisogno  di  alcuna  formalità  o  annotazione.  
Restano  altresí applicabili le discipline speciali, anche di carattere processulare, previste per i crediti ceduti. Nei   
confronti   dei   debitori   ceduti   gli   adempimenti   pubblicitari  previsti  dal  comma  2  producono  gli  effetti  
indicati  dall'articolo  1264  del  codice civile. 5. I creditori  ceduti  hanno facoltà, entro  tre  mesi  dagli  
adempimenti  pubblicitari  previsti dal  comma 2, di esigere dal cedente o dal  cessionario  l'adempimento  delle  
obbligazioni  oggetto  di  cessione.  Trascorso il termine di  tre mesi,  il  cessionario  risponde  in  via  esclusiva.  
6.  Coloro  che  sono  parte  dei  contratti  ceduti  possono  recedere  dal  contratto  entro  tre  mesi  dagli  
adempimenti  pubblicitari  previsti  dal  comma  2  se  sussiste  una  giusta  causa,  salvo  in  questo  caso  la  
responsabilità  del cedente. 7.  Le   disposizioni   del   presente articolo si applicano   anche   alle  cessioni  in  
favore  dei  soggetti,  diversi  dalle  banche,  inclusi  nell’ambito  della  vigilanza  consolidata  ai  sensi  degli  
articoli  65  e  109  e  in  favore  degli  intermediari  finanziari  previsti  dall’articolo  106.   
26 Le cooperative a mutualità prevalente devono prevedere nei propri statuti: a) il divieto di distribuire i dividendi 
in misura superiore all'interesse massimo dei buoni postali fruttiferi, aumentato di due punti e mezzo rispetto al 
capitale effettivamente versato; b) il divieto di remunerare gli strumenti finanziari offerti in sottoscrizione ai soci 
cooperatori in misura superiore a due punti rispetto al limite massimo previsto per i dividendi; c) il divieto di 
distribuire le riserve fra i soci cooperatori; d) l'obbligo di devoluzione, in caso di scioglimento della società, 
dell'intero patrimonio sociale, dedotto soltanto il capitale sociale e i dividendi eventualmente maturati, ai fondi 
mutualistici per la promozione e lo sviluppo della cooperazione. Le cooperative deliberano l'introduzione e la 
soppressione delle clausole di cui al comma precedente con le maggioranze previste per l'assemblea straordinaria. 
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programmi di  assistenza.  Non  spetta  ai  soci  il diritto di recesso previsto dall'articolo 243727, 
primo comma,  lettera a), del  codice  civile.  In  caso  di  inosservanza  degli  obblighi previsti 
dal presente comma e dai commi 3-bis e 3-ter28, il  patrimonio della conferente o, a  seconda  
dei  casi,  della  banca  di  credito cooperativo e' devoluto ai sensi  dell'articolo  17  della  legge  
23 dicembre  2000,  n.  38829.  In  caso  di  mancato  ottenimento   delle autorizzazioni indicate 
al comma 3-bis entro il termine stabilito dal comma 130, la banca di credito cooperativo puo' 
chiedere  l'adesione  a un gruppo cooperativo gia' costituito  entro  i  successivi  novanta giorni. 
In caso di diniego dell'adesione si applica il comma 331.  
 4. In caso di inosservanza di quanto previsto dal comma 3, la Banca d'Italia assume le   
iniziative necessarie per la revoca dell'autorizzazione all'esercizio dell'attivita' bancaria.  
  5. Le banche  di  credito  cooperativo  autorizzate  alla  data  di entrata in vigore del presente 
decreto, si adeguano a quanto previsto dall'articolo 34, comma 132, del decreto legislativo 1° 
settembre 1993,n. 385, entro 60 mesi dalla data di entrata in  vigore  del  presente decreto.” 
Furthermore, the Article 2-bis considers the foundation of a temporary fund for cooperative 
banks (Fondo Temporaneo delle Banche di Credito Cooperativo). This fund (promoted by the 
Federazione italiana delle banche di credito cooperative-casse rurali ed artigiane) is a mutual-
                                                             
27 Art. 2437 codice civile. Diritto di Recesso. Hanno diritto di recedere, per tutte o parte delle loro azioni, i soci 
che non hanno concorso alle deliberazioni riguardanti: a) la modifica della clausola dell'oggetto sociale, quando 
consente un cambiamento significativo dell'attivita' della societa'. 
28 Art. 3-bis, Law 14th February 2016 n. 18, TUB. In deroga a quanto previsto dall'articolo  150-bis,  comma 5, del 
decreto legislativo 1º settembre 1993, n. 385, la  devoluzione non si produce per  le  banche  di  credito  cooperativo  
che,  entro sessanta giorni dalla data  di  entrata  in  vigore  della  legge  di conversione del presente decreto, 
presentino alla Banca d'Italia,  ai sensi dell'articolo 58  del  decreto  legislativo  n.  385  del  1993, istanza, anche 
congiunta, di conferimento  delle  rispettive  aziende bancarie  ad  una  medesima  societa'  per  azioni,  anche  di  
nuova costituzione,  autorizzata  all'esercizio  dell'attivita'   bancaria, purche' la banca istante o, in caso di istanza 
congiunta, almeno  una delle banche istanti possieda, alla data del  31  dicembre  2015,  un patrimonio  netto  
superiore  a  duecento  milioni  di   euro,   come risultante dal bilancio riferito a tale  data,  su  cui  il  revisore 
contabile ha espresso un giudizio senza rilievi. Art. 3-ter. All'atto del conferimento, la banca di  credito  cooperativo 
conferente versa al bilancio dello Stato un importo pari  al  20  per cento del patrimonio netto al 31 dicembre 2015, 
come  risultante  dal bilancio riferito a tale  data,  su  cui  il  revisore  contabile  ha espresso un giudizio senza 
rilievi. 
29 Art. 17 Law 23rd December 2000. La soppressione da parte di societa' cooperative o loro consorzi delle clausole 
di cui al predetto articolo 26 comporta comunque per le stesse l'obbligo di devolvere il patrimonio effettivo in 
essere alla data della soppressione, dedotti il capitale versato e rivalutato ed i dividendi eventualmente maturati, ai 
fondi mutualistici. 
30 Art. 2, comma 1, Law 14th February 2016, n.18, TUB. 1...la  comunicazione  di  cui  all'articolo  37-ter, comma 
1 , e' inviata alla Banca d'Italia entro 18 mesi dall'entrata in vigore delle disposizioni  emanate  ai  sensi  dell'articolo  
37-bis, (commi 7 e 7-bis) , del decreto legislativo 1°  settembre  1993,  n. 385. 
31 Art. 2, comma 3, Law 14th February 2016, n.18, TUB. Le banche  di  credito  cooperativo  autorizzate  alla  data  
di entrata in vigore delle disposizioni emanate ai  sensi  dell'articolo 37-bis, (commi 7 e 7-bis) , del  decreto  
legislativo  1°  settembre 1993, n. 385, che non aderiscono a un  gruppo  bancario  cooperativo, assumono le  
deliberazioni  previste  dall'articolo  36   del  decreto legislativo 1° settembre 1993, n. 385, o deliberano la 
liquidazione  entro il termine indicato ai commi 1 e 2  (del presente  articolo).   
32 Art. 34, comma 1, Law 1st September 1993, n.385, TUB. Soci. 1. Il  numero  minimo  dei  soci  delle  banche  
di  credito  cooperativo  non  può  essere  inferiore  a  cinquecento.  Qualora  tale  numero  diminuisca,  la compagine 
sociale deve essere reintegrata entro un anno; in caso contrario, la banca è posta in liquidazione. 
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insurance tool of private nature thought to support consolidation processes between cooperative 
banks and it has.  
It operates with full autonomy as an insurance tool to support consolidation processes of BCCs. 
The terms and conditions of its intervention are stated in its statute. The adhesion to the fund 
recurs within 30 days from the approval of its statute. At the moment of the adhesion to the 
fund, all the deals in course deriving from the management of the Fund are transmitted to the 
holding company according to the agreements previously taken by each single BCC.  
 
“Art. 2-bis 
Fondo temporaneo delle banche di credito cooperativo. 
  2. Il Fondo opera in piena autonomia  decisionale  quale  strumento mutualistico-assicurativo 
e puo' favorire, in base a quanto  definito nel proprio statuto, processi di consolidamento e  di  
concentrazione delle banche di credito cooperativo. Sono definiti nello  statuto  il sistema 
contributivo,  il  limite  massimo  di  impegno  per  singolo intervento nonche' il limite  massimo  
al  richiamo  di  fondi  dalle banche aderenti.  
  3. L'adesione al Fondo avviene entro trenta giorni  dalla  data  di approvazione del relativo 
statuto”. 
 
This first section of the new law will become the focus of our attention in the following chapters.  
 
Capo II 
The second section regards the warranty on securities. 
Articles 3, 4 and 5 regulate guarantees and structure of securities. They specify what classes of 
titles can be issued and in which modalities. Warranties for senior titles can be provided by the 
Italian State for a certain time of period (a maximum of 36 months from the entry into force of 
this decree) but only if they reach a certain level of rating. Otherwise, specific contracts can be 
stipulated in order to hedge the financial risk. Particular credit measures have to be taken to 
maintain a minimum level of financial flexibility to match creditworthiness of senior titles. 
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Following, Articles 6 and 7 state the characteristics of senior and mezzanine titles in terms of 
remuneration, refund of capital and rate of interests. Then, they provide a list of titles and 
charges in order of priority of payments. 
Articles 8 and 9 refer to the state warranty on credit default swaps (CDS). As specified also in 
the previous Articles, the state guarantee can be granted only to senior titles when some 
requirements are met. The amount of the state guarantee compensation is defined as a basket of 
swap contracts valuated on the base of the rating score assigned by rating agencies. In addition, 
the Article 9 provides the analytical mathematical procedure to determine the CDS value and 
the annual compensation of the state guarantee. 
The Article 10 states that the guarantee can be allowed by a decree issued by the Minister of 
Economy and Finance.  
The Article 11 provides clarifications on how the warranty can be enforced, specifying 
procedures, clauses and terms of payments.  
In the end, Articles 12 and 13 explain that financial resources available for the purposes of this 
second section are represented by a special fund of 120 million euro for the year 2016. Than 
they give information on how these measures can be implemented by the Minister of Economy 
and Finance.  
 
Capo III 
This section treats tax application on crisis procedures. It provides the fiscal criteria to apply to 
banks subjected to resolution. Among the others, the main aspects specify that grants received 
as donations by banks in crisis situations are excluded from the calculation of taxations. 
Furthermore, it introduces an amendment to the fiscal policy regarding real estate transfers in 
judicial sales, stating new clauses and new taxations.   
 
Capo IV 
In the last part of the Law, the Article 17 regards management and protection of savings. It 
provides some endowments that argue to improve the management of savings in order to foster 
lending to businesses. It allows Italian and European FIA (Fondi d’Investimento Alternativo) 
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to invest in credits not only in favour of consumers but also in favour of companies, indicating 
all the criteria and applicable laws.  
Following, subjects such as calculation of financial interests, bank checks and bank instruments 
of payment are regulated applying little endowments to previous laws. 
The last Article is the number 18 that states the rules of the entry into force of the current Law. 
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1.4 CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW LEGISLATION 
 
How  many  cooperative  banking  groups  could  be  created  as  a result  of  the  reform? 
The actual Italian mutual banking system has the following structure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As we can see from the graph, the three main Italian cooperative institutions are:  
 Iccrea Holding SpA in Rome, with a capital of 1 billion euro; 
 Cassa Centrale Raiffeisen in Bolzano with a capital of 300 million euro; 
 Cassa Centrale Banca in Trento with a capital of 250 million euro. 
The initial proposal of the reform regarded the formation of a main CBG under the control of 
Iccrea Holding in Rome and a provincial group under Cassa Centrale Raiffeisen in Bolzano. 
Then, in the last months Federcasse has evaluated the possibility of the creation of a third group 
under Cassa Centrale Banca (CCB) in Trento. This possibility has been taken into consideration 
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after CCB refused the aggregation to the Iccrea’s CBG, stating that the conditions for the 
creation of a unique group do not recur. 
This decision is linked mainly to the regional cultural and territorial features. Indeed, the Italian 
region Trentino-Alto Adige has always maintained its own identity through the years 
developing financial institutions very close to its territory. Therefore, local institutions aim to 
continue to run their local mutual system with full autonomy and to develop their territory as 
they have always done in the past. CCB represents an important network for more of the 50% 
of Italian BCCs especially regarding the supply of IT services and management consultancy 
services. Furthermore, CCB’s group has shown to have a high level of financial soundness, 
efficiency and transparency. It has applied very straight and prudent credit policies that have 
allowed to reduce the level of risk of its financial activities and to better face the financial crisis 
of 2008. Because of these reasons, CCB may have the suitable characteristics to embody the 
role of holding company. 
Therefore, the actual BCCs scenario includes the formation of a main CBG directed by Iccrea 
(meeting the 1 billion euro threshold) and the possible establishment of a second group under 
Cassa Centrale Banca in Trento. A provincial group will be formed in Bolzano under Cassa 
Centrale Raiffeisen. 
Even for the creation of a second CBG, the capital threshold is of 1 billion euro. The role of 
holding company would be embodied by Cassa Centrale Banca and at the moment it seems that 
it may include 15 BCCs from the north until the south of Italy. 
The reform recognizes also a possible ‘way-out’ for BCCs that decide to do not join any group. 
It provides three different possibilities: 
 BCCs can continue to operate as independent entities only if they meet a capital 
threshold of 200 million euro and they pay a 20% tax on their capital. Furthermore, 
BCCs that opt for the way-out have to transfer their banking activity into a company in 
form of S.p.A (that can be also of new-constitution). The cooperative bank will continue 
to exist (changing its corporate purpose) and it will own the majority of the S.p.A.’s 
shares therefore exercising the control over it. The indivisible legal reserves will remain 
under the cooperative. In this way the cooperative bank will lose its credit activities but 
it will maintain its mutual nature.  
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 BCCs with a capital inferior than 200 million euro can remain out of the cooperative 
banking group only if they agree to merge with greater institutions meeting together the 
200 million euro threshold. 
 Another form of way-out is represented by the right of recession from the cooperative 
banking group that allows BCCs to exit from the Iccrea’s group in a second moment. In 
this case, BCCs can choose between the liquidation of their activity or their 
transformation in S.p.A. 
These measures aim to foster the aggregations between BCCs as less than 20 BCCs currently 
meet the 200 million euro threshold. Indeed, in the reform’s vision, BCCs cannot remain on 
their own but they have to be part of large networks. This would allow a higher protection level 
and therefore a major financial soundness of the system. 
The ‘way-out’ has been object of many debates. The main critic regards the incentive of this 
mechanism to the formation of small S.p.A. groups and the merger of small BCCs. Indeed, the 
cooperative banking group under Iccrea risks to be formed by weak BCCs as the most solid 
BCCs would probably opt for the way-out. Therefore, this would not solve the problem of 
financial instability. Moreover, the small S.p.A. groups (that will be created with the way-out) 
would be controlled by cooperative institutions with the same problems of governance and 
territoriality.  
However, only three BCCs (meeting the minimum capital threshold of 200 million euro) have 
opted for the way out while all the other institutions have decided to join the cooperative 
banking group with unique holding. The banks that have decided to remain out of the group 
are: Banca di Cambiano, Chianti Banca (both from Toscana) and Cassa Padana (from Brescia, 
Lombardia). Therefore it seems that the cooperative sector will still go toward a more integrated 
sector developed around the figure of Iccrea holding.  
In the fourth chapter I will deepen the effects of the reform trying to understand what the main 
consequences would be and evaluating other proposals of reform. 
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CHAPTER 2 – ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN COOPERATIVE 
BANKING MODELS: CRÉDIT AGRICOL AND RABOBANK 
 
2.1 COOPERATIVE BANKING GROUP MODELS IN EUROPE: 
DEVELOPMENT OF NETWORK CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
Among Europe, cooperative banks have experienced different developments. However some 
features are common in many European models. In particular, it emerges the increasing role of 
the network central institutions (NCI) based on high levels of cooperation.  
The main reason of the NCIs development was the need to manage liquidity and access to 
capital markets as the small dimensions of member banks did not allow them an adequate 
diversification level and an adequate access to financial resources in case of need. 
Moreover, cooperative banks can obtain further relevant advantages from operating in a well-
integrated network. Among the main important benefits we find: 
 economies of scale linked especially to administration functions. In this way even small 
cooperative banks can benefit from scale economies that they would not be able to 
produce on their own because of their sizes; 
 often, the NCI include an internal central bank that exercises control functions within 
the network providing liquidity and solvency intermediation. Furthermore, it provides 
services such as treasury, risk management and product development within the group 
granting high levels of efficiency; 
 the high level of cooperation represents a guarantee of repayment for customers, 
enhancing the banks ‘opportunity to raise funding; 
 member banks may benefit from the reputation of being part of a credible and sound 
network, increasing confidence with customers. 
However, the overall advantages depend on the nature of the NCI and on how member banks 
can continue to exercise their activities. Indeed, the NCI may also represent a threat for member 
banks if it pursues objectives that are not in line with the principles of the member banks. 
Another issue that may emerge is the so called ‘appropriability hazard’, the risk that 
counterparts may act opportunistically to obtain the advantages generated by the group activity. 
It is therefore important to recognize to the central institution an appropriate level of authority 
and control. Furthermore, several preventive measures have to be applied, such as submission 
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of prudential reports of the member banks to the central institutions, standardized risk-
management practices and the development of compulsory audit procedures). 
The affirmation of the NCI models in Europe has brought to the development of a ‘circular 
authority’ recurring in the high integrated cooperative banks. It may be represented by the 
following scheme:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model shows a first level relationship between member customers and member banks. 
Member customers (who represent the majority of the members) exercise their powers by 
voting for their cooperative bank in accordance with the ‘one-head, one-vote’ principle. Then, 
we find a higher-level relationship between cooperative banks and the NCI. In most of the cases, 
member banks own the majority of the NCI’s capital that guarantees their control over the 
central institution. The central body in turn provides direction and coordination all over the 
group, monitoring and safeguarding the network’s financial resources and mutual functions 
reducing the member banks ‘autonomy.  
Therefore in this model we can distinguish two different relationships: 
 a ‘bottom-up’ authority represented by the two-layer control exercised by member 
customers and member banks over the central institution; 
 a ‘top-down’ authority exercised by the central institution toward the group through 
direction and coordination functions.  
Among Europe, different NCI show different degree of centralization that vary considerably 
between countries and also within countries. The Italian and Spanish models are considered to 
be less centralised than the Austrian, German, Dutch, Finnish and French models.  
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The following table summarizes the characteristics of all the main European banking groups: 
 
We can see from the table above that Spain and Italy operate with a quite flexible system, 
without institutional protection schemes and cross guarantee mechanisms. Also, the banks 
operate with large autonomy as centralized functions are very limited. Because of these aspects 
they are considered to be low-integrated systems and not financially sound. 
As regards Austria and Germany, they cooperative banks are more integrated but do not have 
a central institution that exercises supervisory functions over the local cooperative banks.  
While, Crédit Agricole, Rabobank, Raiffeisen and OP are very well integrated groups. The 
group-level entities are able to issue instructions to local banks in order to guarantee the union 
of the group and the development of a common cooperative strategy. 
We can say that the international landscape provides different examples of possible lines of 
BCCs reform. However, the main current European models that I will consider in my thesis 
are: 
 Crédit Agricole in France;  
 Rabobank in Netherlands.  
In both cases, a corporate central control has been adopted in order to ensure a self-discipline 
of the group and a cost-control within the group. Moreover, in some cases, the central 
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institutions have been listed in order to access capital markets leading to an overall growth of 
the banking system. 
In the following paragraph I will analyse Crédit Agricole and Rabobank Group in order to have 
a better understanding on their working and on their internal mechanisms of control and 
guarantee as their examples may be taken into consideration as possible guides for the reform 
of the Italian BCCs. 
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2.2 ANALYSIS OF CRÉDIT AGRICOLE GROUP 
 
Crédit Agricole (CA) is the first mutual bank in France and one of the most important in Europe 
in terms of market share, earnings and total capital. 
The identity of the group is strictly linked to its cooperative nature as it was founded in 1890 
with the aim to provide financial support to the agricultural sector.  
After the Second World War, Crédit Agricole, as the other large cooperative French groups, 
were subject to state’s ownership and to very restrictive regulations in accordance to which 
cooperative banks were assigned to collect deposits that could only be used to buy government 
bonds. Through the years some amendments were issued to reduce these restrictions, but it was 
only starting from 1984 that the new Banking Law (Banking Law no. 84-46 of 24 January 1984) 
and further following provisions have started a deregulation process setting the privatization 
and the consolidation of the sector. 
This reform of the sector has made cooperative banks to grow through mergers and acquisitions 
strategies over the past two decades. Thanks to these processes, CA has become today one of 
the largest cooperative banking group in the world offering a wide range of banking services 
(e.g. insurance services, asset management, wholesale banking). It is important to highlight that 
despite of its sharp growth in activities and dimensions, CA has strongly maintained its 
cooperative nature, providing two-thirds of their loans to small-size enterprises and to 
households.  
As regards the governance, Crédit Agricole could be defined as a member-centric model based 
on the ‘one-member, one-vote’ principle. Shareholders are entitled to annual dividends and a 
part of the profit has to be allocated to legal reserves.   
As stated by Di Salvo, 2002, network collaboration is an emerging characteristic of cooperative 
banks, particularly prominent in the French model. Indeed, the structure of the group is a three-
tier structure that includes local, regional and national layers. As central network institution, it 
is a well-integrated cooperative bank. Its pyramidal structure is characterized by a top-down 
authority which opposes the bottom-up ownership of members. At each level, the local 
institutions have delegated a great variety of functions to central bodies (such as risk 
management, mutual support, investment activities, debt issuance, group representation and IT 
support) which give them significant power over the local institutions. In particular, under the 
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French Monetary and Financial code, the central organs are required to guarantee the liquidity 
and solvency of the entities within their networks. 
Crédit Agricole’s structure can be represented by the following scheme: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As we can see, the foundation of the group is represented by the Local Credit Co-operative 
banks. Crédit Agricole Group includes 2,531 Local Banks with 5.5 million member 
shareholders consisting primarily of individuals, farmers, and agricultural cooperatives. The 
local banks own all the share capital of the 39 regional banks that in turn hold the majority of 
Crédit Agricole S.A. (CASA), providing funding to the local banks. 
The SAS La Boetie is the holding company through which the regional banks control the 56.7% 
of Crédit Agricole S.A. The purpose of SAS Rue La Boétie is to hold enough shares to ensure 
that it always owns at least 50% of the share capital and voting rights of Crédit Agricole S.A. 
Crédit Agricole S.A. is the listed company, central body of the group. It owns the 25% the 
regional banks ‘capital and it is owned for the 56.7% by them. It is required to monitor financial 
and credit risks and to take all the necessary measures to ensure satisfactory liquidity and 
solvency levels of each member of the group. 
In terms of mutual support, CA group is based on a cross-guarantee system that calls for the 
use of the group’s resources to serve the debt of regional institutions, guarantying all obligations 
of Crédit  Agricole  S.A.  to third  parties.  
Through  these  mutual  support  mechanisms,  the  level  of  risk  incurred  by creditors of 
CASA and by those of the regional banks are identical, and bondholders of CASA are ultimately 
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protected by the whole capital cushion of the regional banks. This has resulted in the assignment 
of identical credit ratings between the regional banks and CASA.  
Moreover, its solidarity mechanism allows a high internal flexibility and capital circulation. 
The group’s primary objective in managing liquidity is to ensure that it has always sufficient 
resources to meet its requirements in the event of any financial crisis. 
Each regional bank makes deposits in the CASA, which uses the funds to settle payments on 
behalf of the group and to provide liquidity loans to regional banks which need liquidity 
support. 
In accordance with the Basel III, there are two bail-in mechanisms that are triggered when: 
 Crédit Agricole S.A. Group’s phased-in CET1 ratio drops below 5.125%; 
 Crédit Agricole Group’s phased-in CET1 ratio falls below 7%.  
French banking laws establish liquidity, solvency, administrative and management rules for all 
three levels of the Crédit Agricole group.   
Through authority delegated by the Bank of France, the CASA exercises regulatory authority 
over its regional banks, particularly in the area of liquidity, solvency, and governance. 
Credit Agricole S.A. is subject to the articles of association provided by the Monetary and 
Finance Code.  
The Article 1 states the object of the group is to facilitate and promote the activities and 
development of all the group members and it has to act as a unique financial institution. 
“1. Crédit Agricole S.A. operates as a central financial institution and ensures that the Group 
acts as a single financial unit in its dealings with third parties with the object of optimising the 
financial management of funds and, in return, the allocation of the financial resources so 
collected.” 
 
In accordance to the Article 3, the holding has to ensure the cohesion of the group and the 
compliance of the group’s activities to the regulations and applicable laws other than to the 
financial solvency and liquidity requirements. 
“3. Crédit Agricole S.A. ensures the cohesion of the Crédit Agricole Mutuel network, the proper 
operation of the credit institutions that are a part thereof, and compliance by such institutions 
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with the applicable laws and regulations by exercising administrative, technical and financial 
supervision thereof; it guarantees the liquidity and solvency of the entire network and all 
institutions affiliated therewith.” 
As regards the internal control procedures, Crédit Agricole complies with the laws and 
regulations of French credit institutions and investment companies. The main legislative and 
financial sources for Crédit Agricole are: 
 the French Monetary and Financial Code; 
 the decree of 3 November 2014, relating to the internal control of   banks; 
 all texts relating to the conduct of banking and financial activities;  
 the Autorité des Marchés Financiers’ General Regulation. 
 
The internal control system and procedures  can  be  classified in this way: 
 application of instructions and guidance given by the Executive Management; 
 a  financial performance objective, to ensure effective and proper use of Group assets 
and resources and protection against the risk of loss; 
 access  to  exhaustive,  accurate  and  timely  information  for  decision-making and risk 
management purposes; 
 a compliance objective, in respect of internal and external rules; 
 prevention and detection of fraud and errors. 
The supervisory body is the Board of Directors. It defines the group’s strategies and general 
policies, determining plans, criteria and thresholds of internal procedures.  The BOD makes 
decisions on all matters concerning the governance of the company and it is informed of any 
significant event of fraud or any other event detected by internal control procedures. 
The executive body defines the company’s general organisation and ensures that it is 
implemented in an efficient way and by competent managers. It also controls if suitable risk 
measurement procedures are adopted and if they are correctly developed. 
Internal credit decisions are determined on the quality of the risk of the counterparty, assessed 
by an internal rating methods. The credit decision must form part of the formally approved risk 
strategies. The internal rating system develops all procedures and controls to calculate credit 
risk, borrower ratings and loss given default for all the group’s exposures.  
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Second-level controls are developed to test compliance with limits. They consists in processes 
for monitoring individual risks and portfolio risks, in order to detect any possible deterioration 
in the quality of the counterparty and Crédit Agricole’s commitments.  
Summarizing, in accordance with principles in force within the Credit Agricole S.A. Group, 
Crédit Agricole’s Risk and Permanent Control Department implements a qualitative and 
quantitative system designed to identify, assess, prevent and monitor operational risk (in 
accordance with the Basel II). Crédit Agricole S.A., as the central body of the group ensures 
that all of its affiliated members, maintain satisfactory liquidity and solvency levels.  
Due to this joint and general guarantee, a default of Crédit Agricole S.A. would be covered by 
the aggregate capital of the 39 regional banks. In turn, the default of a regional bank would be 
immediately covered by Crédit Agricole S.A. and therefore there cannot be any individual 
default of a regional bank unless Crédit Agricole S.A. itself defaults. 
This mechanism represents a fundamental pillar of the group’s structure. It ensures a high 
solvency capacity of the bank and financial soundness that individual BCCs would not have if 
they were on their own. 
This is an example of the substantial advantages for all member BCCs and therefore it could be 
taken into consideration for the development of the Italian reform of mutual banks.  
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2.3 ANALYSIS OF RABOBANK GROUP 
                           
Rabobank is the biggest cooperative banking group in Netherland, consisting of 248 member 
banks which fully own Rabobank Netherland. The  whole  group  services  9  million  clients,  
1.55  million  of  which  are members  of  the  248  local  Rabobanks.   
Rabobank finds its origins in the local cooperative banks of the rural community.  The first 
cooperative agricultural banks were born in response to the agricultural crisis of the 19th century 
that brought to the necessity of a new banking system in order to boost the agricultural sector.  
The first suggested solution was proposed by the German mayor, Raiffeisen. In 1864 he 
founded the first rural cooperative credit society and all the farmers and traders that wanted a 
loan from this society had to become a member. As the bank had no government funds, the 
local population had to provide small amounts of savings in order to enable the institution to 
grant loans to member borrowers.  
In the following years, local banks felt the need for a better structured organization for a higher 
degree of support and coordination. As answer to this situation, two financial institutions were 
born: “Boerenleenbank” in the south (Eindhoven) and “Raiffeisenbank” in the north (Utrecht) 
and in 1972 they merged in RA-BO bank (from the abbreviation of both the names of the two 
previous banks). 
Nowadays, Rabobank Group may be defined as a centralised model where member banks have 
delegated significant supervisory and decision taking power to the central entity.  It has a three 
tier structure including local member banks, the central body Rabobank Nederland (RN) and 
the various subsidiaries of Rabobank Nederland. 
Rabobank is a central network institution. It is fully owned by the 153 local member banks. 
Within its network there are two levels of membership: the local member banks are members 
of Rabobank Nederland, and each member bank has members in its territory.  
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Rabobank’s structure may be represented by the following scheme: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The holding Rabobank Nederland has the legal form of a joint stock co-operative society as the 
local Rabobanks are both its members and shareholders. It advises and supports its member 
banks, supervises their liquidity and solvency positions and acts as bankers’ bank for the whole 
Group. RN is supported by its subsidiaries to offer services to member banks and their 
customers. Subsidiaries are not cooperative institutions but they have the form of private or 
public limited companies.  
The group is based on a cross-guarantee system in accordance to which all member banks are 
liable for the obligations of all other members and the Group itself, granting a full mutual 
support.  
Each member bank is a separate cooperative bank in its own right and is legally independent: 
they are not to be regarded as branches of Rabobank Nederland. 
Rabobank Nederland exercises several functions in favour of the member banks: 
 it acts as a central bank of member banks and it intermediates their liquidity 
requirements making financial resources to flow throughout the group; 
 it provides important services to the member banks such as treasury, risk management 
and product development; 
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 it exercises a central supervisory role over the member banks on the basis of delegated 
authority from De Nederlandsche Bank. It also directs the activities of its subsidiaries; 
 it is a banks on its own providing wholesale and retail services.  
As supervisor, Rabobank Nederland has the power and authority to set rules for member banks. 
Therefore, there is a two-way relationship between the central institution and the local banks: 
the member banks own and influence Rabobank Nederland which in turn has supervisory and 
regulatory powers over the member banks. Furthermore, member banks cannot increase or 
decrease their operations branches without Rabobank Nederland approval. 
Member banks have no entitlement to the equity of their local bank. For the group as a whole, 
the dominant source of equity capital is retained profits, and a minimum of 75% of profits must 
be retained as reserves contributing to Tier 1 capital. No dividend distribution can be made to 
members, though a small proportion of profits can be used for social activities.  
The individual member banks pool their equity into the central entity. The capital contribution 
of each local bank remains traceable and it contributes to determine the number of votes in the 
new governance. The equity development of each local bank is monitored as a result of annual 
internal financial reporting.  
The group operates with a decentralised organisation of local banks. The relationships between 
the group’s entities are regulated by the internal principles of association, stated below:  
 “1. local banks give substance to clients' financial needs by providing transparent, honest and 
logical service across the entire spectrum; 
2. each local bank uses the interplay between the local members' council, the management team 
and the local supervisory board to formulate its own vision on stimulating the development of 
its geographical region; 
3. proceeding from a jointly determined collective framework, the management team bears the 
administrative responsibility for the local ambitions regarding clients, the market and the 
geographical region. The management team is inspired by an active local members' council 
and stimulated by a regionally involved local supervisory board with an all-round perspective 
on the organisation; 
4. by contributing expertise, resources and by establishing connections, Rabobank is 
economically and socially relevant; 
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5. in order to maintain a strong collective position, the local banks collaborate with the 
supporting organisation in the Rabobank cooperative, which operates as a single powerful unit;  
6. the Rabobank members are represented indirectly in the highest decision making body, the 
general members’ council.” This enables the bank to finance the growth of its activities with 
its own funds, without being forced to recur to external capital suppliers. Moreover, this strong 
capital base is also the main reason for its AAA credit ratings, through which the bank is able 
to obtain the lowest possible funding costs from the professional financial markets. 
Through the years Rabobank has adapted its governance in line with its structural evolution. 
Governance structures exist at two levels in any network cooperative: at the local member bank 
and at the central bank. Member banks can choose between two alternative governance models: 
the Partnership Model and the Executive Model: 
 under the Partnership Model, the Board of the local bank is made up of people elected 
by members and professional managing director appointed by the Supervisory Board. 
All important strategic decisions are taken by the General Meeting in which all members 
have voting rights; 
 in the Executive Model, each bank has a Board of Management operating under the 
supervision of the Supervisory Board. None of the board members is elected by the 
members. However, in this model the bank is required to institute a Members’ Counsel 
which is made of members in order to promote member influence and control. This body 
is therefore equivalent to the General Meeting. 
As regards the evolution of the main bodies of the governance, the Board of Directors has seen 
to increase their legal authority to issue enforceable instructions to the management. In addition, 
the figure of a professional banker has been introduced.  
Local Supervisory Bodies continue to have important tasks and responsibilities, including a 
supervisory role to guarantee the local focus. Furthermore, they monitor the execution of the 
strategy and policy plans by the Management Team Chairman and evaluate whether the bank’s 
services satisfy the needs of customers and members. 
The Local Supervisory Body and Local Management Team are expected to pursue objectives 
determined at a group level, in line with the values and strategy of Rabobank. In case of conflict 
of interest, the Executive Board can intervene withdrawing the authorisation recognized to the 
LSB. 
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The General Memebers’Council instead evaluates the governance and the banking business on 
the basis of commonly agreed strategic principles. It has the power to amend the statutes or 
change the legal status of the group, other than the right to approve for major decisions of the 
Executive Board, influencing Rabobank’s strategy. 
The Executive Board governs Rabobank and it is fully responsible for the whole banking 
business. It has the power to intervene directly in local banks if necessary and it is responsible 
for the compliance of local banks with external regulations. 
The Executive Board has recognized various authorizations to the Local Management Team 
Chairmen to execute their functions locally and to take responsibility for their bank. The main 
reason for that is the preservation of local orientation, local entrepreneurship and of the different 
features of local banks. The Executive Board may take corrective measures in case of 
underperformance or in case of financial troubles of the local banks (such as high risk 
operations or governance issues).  
Following, a representation of the connections between local banks and central bodies of the 
group. 
 
 
Summarizing, we can say that under Rabobank’s view, understanding each entity’s 
background, having a common goal and acting decisively are all factors that determine success. 
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Due to its decentralised nature, Rabobank is based on a strong collaboration and network, both 
between the various components of the whole group and through the strengths developed with 
external parties to pursue economic and social initiatives.  
The group does not aim to maximise profits but to maximise the economic benefit for its co-
operative members. Profit is only an instrument to serve the continuity of the co-operatives, 
which is done by demanding the lowest possible price for loans and credits from the member 
borrowers, and at the same time by creating the most favourable lending conditions. If a 
member’s business is in financial difficulties, a local Rabobank will give support as long as 
possible. 
Through the years, the group has been able to strengthen its cooperative and banking structures 
bringing the entire group to a great financial stability always maintaining its cooperative 
principles.  
 
  
  
50 
  
2.4 OVERVIEW OF THE ITALIAN COOPERATIVE BANKING SYSTEM IN 
THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
 
In the previous paragraphs, we have seen that the main European cooperative banking groups, 
Crédit Agricole and Rabobank, have experienced a development based on second-tier 
structured banks and other financial departments aimed to safeguard the direct relationship with 
customers, members and local communities.  
Both the systems are characterized by a great integration level and by a central holding that 
exercises a role of direction and control of the entire group.  
Under the financial aspect, these groups are internally unified by cross-guarantee mechanisms 
that provide a form of patrimonial solidarity toward the BCCs creditors as it allows to move 
patrimonial resources among the group in order to meet the banking prudential requirements. 
The main rights and obligations of the member BCCs are provided by the cohesion contract 
instead of from participation shares of the traditional system. 
In the Rabobank Group, the holding has assumed the major responsibility for direction and 
control on local member banks that maintain a considerable degree of autonomy. The central 
holding consolidates the capital of all the members through a strict mechanism of “cross 
guarantees” and meets the capital ratios on a consolidated base.  
Instead, in Crédite Agricole the holding bank exercises the function of leadership and control 
of the group, consolidating assets, liabilities and equity with the S.A. Crédit Agricole. 
As regards the current Italian cooperative banking sector, BCCs operate in a decentralised way. 
Most of the main functions are developed on a voluntary basis as local banks have a high degree 
of autonomy. BCCs are grouped into separate regional federations, which provide technical 
assistance and internal auditing procedures of their members. The functions of these regional 
bodies are overseen by the national association, Federcasse, which is also in charge of the 
BCCs’ strategic planning functions.  
Some steps have been taken through the years toward a more integrated structure. In 2008 the 
Institutional Guarantee Fund (Fondo di Garanzia Instituzionale – FGI) was founded with the 
aim to use network resources to safeguard the liquidity and solvency of the member banks. 
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However, the Banking Law of 1993 (TUB) keeps Italian BCCs very close to their original 
nature, providing rigid capital and structural constraints33 that obstacle the growth of the sector. 
The cooperative banking sector has represented an important portion of the Italian banking 
system, growing consistently through the years. However, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 has 
impacted its financial stability as the sharp increase in non-performing loans has worsened its 
credit conditions. This has represented a great issue especially for the smaller BCCs that usually 
have more risky loan portfolios.   
The financial crisis has brought in light the weaknesses of the Italian cooperative banks, making 
urgent the need of a reform to adapt the traditional characteristics of BCCs to the changing 
financial environment. The main challenge for the cooperative sector consists in countering 
individual risks and increasing external funding capacities while maintaining the cooperative 
identity. Another goal is to enforce intra-network mutual support systems. Guarantee schemes 
of are considered to be one of the main supporting elements of the “safety measures” 
mechanism of the individual banks, since they are closely interrelated with the ability to practice 
monitoring actions and ensure the sound and prudent management of the member banks. 
Indeed, after the financial crisis of 2008, it has emerged that the most integrated cooperative 
groups, especially those that consolidate the capital of member banks according to cross 
guarantee schemes, have been able to better face financial troubles and to promote a progressive 
strengthening of the capital and dimension. This was specially realized through the greater use 
of market capital listing central holdings on the stock exchange. 
It is clear that the systems of cooperative banks that are still strongly decentralized, such as in 
the Italian case, will have to converge towards more integrated organizational models, through 
an overall network enforcement, in order to meet both the re-regulation process and financial 
needs on the markets. At the same time, it will be necessary to strengthen the constraints within 
the internal guarantee and solidarity mechanisms, in order to maximize the benefits from the 
stability of local mutual banks. 
The central entities are responsible for the healthy performance of both the banking and the 
cooperative dimensions of banks, ensuring the economic results and the protection of the 
cooperative roots. Even though there is no a possible common governance structure for each 
                                                             
33  In accordance with the TUB, BCCs have to allocate at least 70% of their profits as reserves. Individual 
participation cannot exceed €50,000 per member. Assets that qualify for a zero risk-weighting under the Capital 
Requirements Directive (Directive 2006/48/EC) need to represent at least half of the risk-weighted assets. In 
addition, loans shall be granted primarily to members. Expansions into non-contiguous regions are possible only 
if the cooperatives have a sufficient number of members in the area. 
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banking group, the current reforms of the mutual sector in Europe aim to enforce these financial 
institutions. A major monitoring over risks, an increase of the prudential measures and a more 
integrated structure would allow to find alternative funding sources and to increase the 
capitalisation levels giving more stability to the sector. Financial soundness, innovation and 
higher efficiency would ensure the continuity for the member banks, fostering benefits in the 
banking industry. 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE CONTRACT OF COHESION: ON WHAT 
PRINCIPLES SHOULD IT BE BASED? 
 
3.1 ANALYSIS OF FITD FINANCIAL PRINCIPLES 
 
The 27th May 2016 the National Council of Federcasse issued a working paper that summarizes 
all the results and reflections developed by a specific study group related to the formation of 
the cohesion contract. This document represents just a starting point as Federcasse aims to 
involve further exponents of the BCCs in order to receive a greater contribution and more 
indications about the formation of the contract.  
However, as a final version of the cohesion contract is not available yet, in order to develop my 
thesis I will take into consideration the financial principles that represent the pillars of the 
supervisory and management financial institutions. Then, I will try to understand what core 
financial principles should be considered to constitute the basis of the CBG and I will try to 
suggest some proposals for the formation of the cohesion contract.  
The first financial regulation I will analyse is the one provided by the Fondo Interbancario di 
Tutela dei Depositi (FITD) and by the Fondo di Garanzia dei Depositanti del Credito 
Cooperativo (FGDCC). Indeed, these institutions have very relevant roles in the financial sector 
as deposit insurance is an essential feature of the safety net that underpins the stability of the 
entire banking system. Deposit insurance supports both the social function of savings and the 
monetary function of banking intermediation in order to avoid dramatic effects on depositors 
in case of bank failures. This is the reason why in all the evolved banking systems at the side 
of indirect protection (provided by vigilance authorities) even direct protection measures are 
implemented to guarantee deposits.  
The first mechanism of deposit insurance was established in the US in 1933 with the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Than other forms of guarantee have been developed through 
the rest of Europe as a consequence of the development of the banking activity and of the 
increase of its riskiness linked to the higher presence of potential elements of instability derived 
from the globalization process34. However, the formation of such guarantee schemes have led 
to an increase in the risk of moral hazard as they may represent an incentive for managers to 
undertake riskier activities and to do not develop the necessary controls on the quality of loans. 
                                                             
34 A.M. Tarantola, Ronchi, 1986. 
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Because of this reason, the protection given by these funds is never for the total sum of money 
but only for partial amounts. In Italy, such as in the other European states, the guarantee funds 
require member banks to meet some financial parameters in order to protect the funds 
themselves and to incentivize the other banks to exercise a healthy and prudent management.  
As said before, in Italy, two guarantee Funds are present, the FITD and the FGDCC. 
The FITD is a private-law mandatory Consortium recognized by the Bank of Italy, established 
in 1987. In Italy the principle of mandatory membership in a deposit guarantee system has been 
introduced by the Law 385, 1st September 1993 (TUB). The goal of the FITD is to guarantee 
depositors of member banks and the financial resources necessary for its interventions are 
provided by the member banks in proportion to their risk levels.  
Instead, the FGDCC has been established for BCCs in accordance with the European Directive 
n. 19/1994. As stated by the Art. 535 of the FGDCC, the financial resources used for the Fund’s 
interventions are provided by the member banks and they are determined through a risk-based 
approach considering the patrimonial and liquidity levels, profits, exposure to credit risk, 
diversification level and cost efficiency. As determined by the Art. 2536 of the FGDCC’s statute, 
the financial resources are distributed through Iccrea Banca, Cassa Centrale Nord-Est and Cassa 
Raiffeisen.  
In accordance with the Art. 96-ter37 of the Law 385/1993, the Bank of Italy has full powers in 
supervising and coordinating the activities of the deposit protection schemes of the whole 
                                                             
35 Art. 5 Statuto Fondo di Garanzia dei Depositanti del Credito Cooperativo. “... il Fondo si avvale dei mezzi a tal 
fine somministrati dalle Banche consorziate, secondo un meccanismo commisurato alla rischiosità di ciascuna 
Consorziata...il rischio di ogni banca viene valutato sulla base dei seguenti profili gestionali: patrimonializzazione, 
redditività, liquidità, esposizione al rischio di credito, esposizione al rischio di tasso di interesse, efficienza di 
costo”. 
36  Art. 25 Statuto Fondo di Garanzia dei Depositanti del Credito Cooperativo. Misura e modalità di 
somministrazione dei mezzi. 1. I mezzi richiesti dal Comitato di Gestione, ai sensi del precedente Articolo 24, 
sono somministrati per il tramite di Iccrea Banca, della Cassa Centrale Nord-Est e della Cassa Centrale Raiffeisen, 
che fungono da Tesorieri del Fondo. 
37 Articolo 96-ter Statuto Fondo di Garanzia dei Depositanti del Credito Cooperativo. Poteri della Banca d'Italia. 
1. La Banca d'Italia, avendo riguardo alla tutela dei depositanti e alla capacita' dei sistemi di garanzia di effettuare 
i rimborsi dei depositi protetti: 
a) riconosce i sistemi di garanzia, approvandone gli statuti, a condizione che i sistemi stessi presentino 
caratteristiche adeguate allo svolgimento delle funzioni disciplinate dalla presente sezione e tali da comportare una 
ripartizione equilibrata dei rischi di insolvenza sul sistema bancario;  
b) vigila sul rispetto di quanto previsto ai sensi della presente sezione  
c) verifica che la tutela offerta dai sistemi di garanzia esteri cui aderiscono le succursali italiane di banche 
extracomunitarie sia equivalente a quella offerta dai sistemi di garanzia italiani; 
d) le procedure di coordinamento con le autorita' degli Stati membri in ordine all'adesione delle succursali di 
banche comunitarie a un sistema di garanzia italiano e alla loro esclusione dallo stesso; 
€transfrontalieri o la fusione fra sistemi di garanzia di Stati membri diversi e partecipa alla vigilanza su di essi; 
f) informa senza indugio i sistemi di garanzia se rileva che una banca aderente presenta criticita' tali da poter 
determinare l'attivazione del sistema; 
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Italian financial system. The Bank of Italy declares the state of insolvency and starts the 
controlled administration or the compulsory liquidation of the bank in sufferance. The Bank of 
Italy also authorizes both the FITD and FGDCC interventions based on an ex-post contribution 
system. Therefore, the resources for interventions are provided by member banks only after the 
Funds’ requests and for the determined amount. This solution has been preferred to the one of 
making member banks paying annual quotas (how it happens in the US) in order to avoid to 
mobilize financial resources when it is not necessary38. The fund consists of an accounting 
provision and a solidarity pact between the member banks that are committed to intervene to 
support each other, in the established measures, while there are no real provisions of money 
made available to the fund. In this way, instead of paying on the basis of their risk profile 
according to a merit-based system, the healthy banks of the group pay for the crisis of the banks 
in sufferance.  
The FITD and the FGDCC are characterized by some common characteristics as regards their 
functions and risk measurement methodologies of member banks. Both Funds’ interventions 
can have the form of preventive actions (such as funding operations, granting of guarantees, 
and participations to capital increases or acquisition of assets) or assurance functions as in cases 
of banks in liquidation phase the fund concurs to pay deposits39: 
The choice of the type of intervention is based on the least cost principle and in the event of 
intervention the Funds must operate in the interests of their members. 
The level of coverage of both the Funds is 100,000 euros per depositor and per bank. For 
instance, if a depositor has 65,000€ in a bank that enters in a liquidation phase, the FITD/FGD 
will refund the whole sum of money. Instead, if the deposit amounts to 120,000€ (or to any 
amount exceeding 100,000€) the refund will be of 100,000€ as the maximum refundable 
amount is of 100,000€ per depositor. The payout time is presently established at 20 working 
days from the date the compulsory administrative liquidation takes effect (this time period will 
reduce to 7 working days with the transposition of Directive 2014/49/EU). 
                                                             
g) puo' emanare disposizioni attuative delle norme contenute nella presente Sezione. 
38 A.M. Tarantola, La vigilanza sulle banche e sui gruppi bancari, Il Mulino, 1996. 
39 Among the FITD interventions, the main ones have been:  
 1) Cassa di Risparmio di Prato (1987): the Fund granted to the bank in compulsory liquidation phase fundings for 
200 billion L., participating than to a capital increase of 800 billion L. As a consequence of this intervention the 
Fund become the majority shareholder of the Monte dei Paschi group.  
 2) Banco di Tricesimo (Udine, 1990): the Fund intervened to refund deposits of the banks in compulsory 
liquidation phase for an amount equal to 6,5 billion L. 
 3) Banca di Girgenti (1991): the bank was first subject to extraordinary administration and then it entered into a 
compulsory liquidation phase. The Fund intervened paying the deficit of sale to the bank that took over the 
financial institution in liquidation phase. 
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As stated by the Art. 2140 of its statute, the FITD: 
 provides financial resources until reaching the objective level equal to the 0,8% of 
the total of deposits protected by the July, 3rd 2024, through the ordinary 
contributions of the member banks by the September 30th of each year; 
 the available financial resources are allocated to the interventions of the fund; 
 the member banks pay annually the ordinary contributions, in proportion to the 
amount of the protected deposits and of the risk level of each member bank, 
determined on the base of the management indicators; 
 the available financial resources of the fund are invested in low risk activities with 
a sufficient diversification level. The gains of such activities contribute to achieve 
the objective level; 
 after each intervention (and at least annually) the fund informs the member banks 
about the accumulation resource plan for the achieving of the objective level, 
including the additional contributions for the reintegration of the resources used in 
the interventions. 
The interventions of the fund are regulated by the article 2941 of the FITD statute. The FITD 
acts in case of compulsory administrative liquidation of the banks part of the group and also in 
cases of extraordinary administration of the member banks. In both cases, the interventions of 
the fund have to be authorized by the Bank of Italy and they may be realized through operating 
companies, whose object is closely related to the institutional purposes of the Fund. 
                                                             
40  “Art. 21 FITD Statute. Risorse finanziarie disponibili. 
1. Il Fondo costituisce risorse finanziarie disponibili fino al raggiungimento del livello-obiettivo pari allo 0,8% del 
totale dei depositi protetti entro il 3 luglio 2024, ai sensi della Direttiva 2014/49/UE, attraverso contribuzioni 
ordinarie delle banche aderenti al 30 settembre di ogni anno. 
2. Le risorse finanziarie disponibili sono destinate, al netto degli eventuali impegni assunti ai sensi dell’art. 24, 
agli interventi di cui all’art. 29. 
3. Le consorziate versano annualmente le contribuzioni ordinarie, che sono commisurate alla consistenza dei 
depositi protetti, nonché al grado di rischio relativo a ciascuna banca aderente, determinato sulla base degli 
indicatori gestionali, secondo le modalità di cui all’art. 10 dell’Appendice. 
4. Le risorse finanziarie disponibili del Fondo sono investite in attività a basso rischio e con sufficiente 
diversificazione e i frutti concorrono al raggiungimento del livello-obiettivo 
6. A seguito di ciascun intervento e comunque almeno annualmente, il Fondo informa le banche consorziate in 
merito all’attuazione del piano di accumulo delle risorse disponibili per il raggiungimento del livello obiettivo, ivi 
incluse le contribuzioni aggiuntive per il reintegro delle risorse utilizzate a fronte di interventi.” 
41 “Art. 29 FITD Statute. Interventi. 1. Il Fondo interviene: 
a) nei casi di liquidazione coatta amministrativa delle banche consorziate autorizzate in Italia e, per le succursali 
di banche comunitarie consorziate operanti in Italia, nei casi in cui sia intervenuto il sistema di garanzia dello Stato 
di appartenenza; 
b) nei casi di amministrazione straordinaria delle banche consorziate autorizzate in Italia. 
2. Gli interventi del Fondo sono subordinati all'autorizzazione della Banca d’Italia. 
3. Gli interventi possono essere effettuati anche attraverso società strumentali, il cui oggetto sia strettamente 
collegato alle finalità istituzionali del Fondo.” 
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Similar functions are developed by the FGD. As stated by the Art. 2842 of the FGD Statute, the 
maximum amount that each member BCC may be required to provide to the Fund is equal to 
the 0.8% of the total of deposits by the 30th June of the previous year. The Fund aims to 
guarantee the deposits of the member BCCs in accordance with the mutual principles and of 
the cooperative credit43. As the FITD, the FGD intervenes in case of compulsory administrative 
liquidation or extraordinary administration or financial difficulties of member banks44. 
To sum up, it could be said that the interventions of both the Funds aim to: 
 assure liquidity to all depositors to ensure their right to full availability of deposits; 
 prevent that the regulatory capital of the bank decreases too much (making the bank 
undercapitalized); 
 avoid the closing of the branches, protecting the business continuity of the bank and its 
employment levels; 
 in the interest of the entire system as a whole, to contain and prevent mass phenomena 
not rational and not justified, that can easily spread to other banks, linked to the fear of 
losing their savings, with an excess of  withdraw requests. 
 
How do the FITD and FDG evaluate the level of riskiness of member banks? 
Both the Funds perform their guarantee function through the use of a monitoring system that 
allows them to control the overall situation of all their member banks through a Balance-Sheet 
Indicators system that tests four risk profiles:  
 Asset Quality;  
 Solvency;  
 Liquidity; 
                                                             
42 Art. 28 FGD Statute. Ammontare dei mezzi. 1. L’ammontare massimo dei mezzi che ciascuna Consorziata può 
essere chiamata a somministrare complessivamente al Fondo, ai fini degli interventi di cui all’art. 3, è stabilito 
nella misura dello 0,80% dell’ammontare complessivo dei depositi, alla data del 30 giugno dell’anno precedente, 
desunto dalle segnalazioni di Vigilanza. 
43 Art. 2 FGD Statute. Scopo. 1. Scopo del Fondo è la tutela dei depositanti delle Banche ad esso consorziate ... in 
osservanza alle previsioni del D. Lgs. 659/96 ed in conformità ai principi della mutualità e nello spirito della 
cooperazione di credito. 
44 Art. 3 FGD Statute. Interventi. 1. Il Fondo interviene: 
a) in caso di liquidazione coatta amministrativa delle Banche consorziate autorizzate in Italia, e per le succursali 
di Banche di Credito Cooperativo comunitarie consorziate operanti in Italia, nei casi in cui sia intervenuto il 
sistema di garanzia dello Stato di appartenenza; 
b) in caso di amministrazione straordinaria e di gestione provvisoria delle Banche consorziate italiane; 
c) in caso di situazione di difficoltà delle Banche consorziate italiane. 
2. Gli interventi del Fondo sono subordinati alla autorizzazione della Banca d’Italia. 
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 Profitability.  
 
Asset Quality Profile (A1) 
The Balance-Sheet ratio A1 measures the capacity of a bank to absorb potential losses without 
risk of insolvency.  
The risk of loss is given by the ratio of Bad Debts to Supervisory Capital. A1 is calculated 
through the following formula: 
 
 
 
The numerator is the amount of Bad Debts related to ordinary clients, computed net of all related 
adjustments. 
 
Solvency Profile (P) 
The indicator P provides a measure of the bank’s capital. Its formula expresses the excess of 
capital with respect to risk weighted assets. 
The ratio P is calculated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Liquidity Profile (L) 
The liquidity ratio gives a measure of the structural liquidity of the bank.  
Its formula is the following: 
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Profitability Profile (D1) (D2) 
The profitability profile includes two ratios. 
D1 refers to the aspect of the ordinary business of the bank. It highlights both the coverage of 
costs of the typical banking activity (through gross income) and the ability to meet possible 
extraordinary expenses. 
D2 measures Loan Losses on Profit before Taxes. 
These two indicators are calculated as follows: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The calculation of Gross Income and Profit before Tax includes interests arising from bad loans. 
D2 is calculated only if the numerator and the denominator are both positive.   
Otherwise, the following coefficient have to be applied for the calculation of the Aggregate 
Indicator: 
 
 
 
 
The five ratios are computed quarterly and they have to be sent to the Fund by all member banks 
on individual basis. Quarterly ratios are referred to 31st March, 30th June, 30th September and 
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31st December of each year. The same ratios cannot be calculated on a group basis since 
currently consolidated prudential returns are mainly reported by banks to the Bank of Italy every 
six months. 
The following thresholds are set for each indicator: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each class has a corresponding coefficient: 
 
 
 
 
 
The sum of the coefficients of each ratio defines the Aggregate Indicator (AI).  
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The Statute, the Statutory Position is determined according to the following scheme depending 
on the value of the Aggregate Indicator: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In accordance with the article 21 of the FITD statute, the total amount of money that the member 
banks are committed to make available to the Fund for interventions is between 0.4% and 0.8% 
of the Reimbursable Funds. However, these resources have a virtual nature as the Fund asks 
banks for resources only at the moment of the effective disbursement in favour of a member 
bank in crisis. If this condition does not occur, resources for interventions are just a commitment 
of the member banks and of the Fund.  
The contribution quota is based on the portion of each bank’s deposits covered by the Fund. As 
stated by the Art. 25 of the FITD statute, the Contribution Base is identified as the amount of 
Reimbursable Funds. The Fund calculates and communicates to the consortium members the 
contribution quotas for interventions commitments on a yearly basis, calculated on the base of 
the last available report. 
For each member bank, the proportional quota of the contribution is given by the Individual 
Contribution Base over the Total Reimbursable Funds: 
 
 
 
Two correction methods are applied to adjust this proportional quota. The regressive 
mechanism, as provided by the article 14 of the Appendix to the Statute, and the Weighted 
Average Aggregate Indicator (WAAI) provided by articles 4 and 5 of the Appendix of the 
statute may increase or decrease the proportional quota. 
The Regressive Correction Method uses an increasing/decreasing percentage inversely linked 
to the size of the bank expressed by the amount of its contribution base. This correction 
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mechanism decreases the proportional quotas of bigger banks while it increases those of smaller 
banks. The percentage of increase and decrease of the proportional quotas shall vary from a 
maximum of +7.5% to a minimum of -7.5%. 
The decreasing percentage is calculated through the following formula: 
-7.5% : (d - f) = x : (c – f) 
hence, for c > f      x = -7.5% * (c – f) / (d – f) 
The increasing percentage is determined as follows: 
+7.5% : (f - e) = x : (f – c) 
hence, for c < f      x = +7.5% * (f – c) / (f – e) 
where: 
c = proportional quota (in thousands) of the bank’s contribution base; 
d = proportional quota (in thousands) of the highest contribution base recorded in the system 
on the date record; 
e = proportional quota (in thousands) of the lowest contribution base recorded in the system 
on the date of record; 
f = equilibrium quota, that is the proportional quota of contribution base that does not suffer 
from any increase or decrease. 
 As regards the Weighted Average Aggregate Indicator is calculated based on the previous three 
six-monthly balance sheet ratios that the bank submits to the Fund. This mechanism assigns a 
bigger weight to the closest report (in terms of time). 
When the WAAI is: 
- greater than 3, the bank’s contribution quota shall be increased proportionally to the 
WAAI value; 
- greater than 0 and less or equal to 3, the bank’ contribution quota remains unchanged; 
- equal to 0, the bank’s contribution quota shall benefit from a reduction, commensurate 
with the total amount of increases. 
Therefore we could say that the guarantee mechanisms of both the Funds are very similar as 
they are based on the same indicators, thresholds and correction methods. The only difference 
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is that while the FITD operates for the Italian banking sector, the FGD operates specifically for 
the mutual financial institutions. While the FITD was established in 1987, the FGD was formed 
earlier in 1978 as it derived from the already existing “Fondo Centrale di Garanzia delle Casse 
Rurali ed Artigiane”. Its establishment was linked to the wide territorial presence of the BCCs 
to support local communities that in turn has led to the necessity to provide guarantee to clients 
through the creation of a specific fund. The FGD guarantees depositors of each BCC from the 
risk of insolvency45. As said before, in case of financial distress of a member bank, the other 
BCCs intervene to provide financial support to guarantee deposits until a maximum of 100,000€ 
per depositor. The member BCCs are required to provide financial resources to the Fund only 
in case of necessity, otherwise the quota they have to pay remains just a commitment. However, 
as a consequence of this mechanism, if large BCCs or several small BCCs find themselves in 
financial troubles at the same time, healthy BCCs may risk to do not be able to face these 
situations compromising their financial stability. To face this problem, in other European States, 
the Funds to support mutual banks are formed by real financial resources, in this way they are 
able to ensure a prompt intervention to financial crisis.  
In conclusion it could be said that the presence of guarantee mechanisms in the banking system 
is essential to guarantee financial stability that is considered to be the first protection of 
savings46. Especially the establishment of the FGD has allowed to enforce the capacity of the 
mutual banking sector improving the analysis of the member BCCs stability and the detection 
of criticises trough early warning systems. Interventions and recovery plans have been 
improved and continuously monitored to ensure the efficacy of their effects and developing the 
cooperative sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
45 Furthermore, the introduction of the Fondo di Garanzia degli Obbligazionisti (FDO) has strengths the soundness 
and trustiness offering higher protection to clients. Indeed, it guarantees the refund of bonds in case of the bank’s 
insolvency. 
46 In the first twenty years of activity, the FGD has provided funding grants for a total amount of 44,8 billions L. 
and further support interventions for 241 billion L. 
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3.2 ANALYSIS OF BANKING RATING PRINCIPLES 
 
Other financial principles that may provide a guide for the formation of the cohesion contract 
are those provided by the Credit Rating for the evaluation of risk factors in assessing the future 
creditworthiness of financial institutions.  
Indeed, Credit Rating Agencies (CRA)  are  defined  as  independent  providers  of  credit  
opinions  and  they  play  an  important  role  as  their scores are used by investors, borrowers, 
issuers and governments for a variety of reasons. The main three CRA in the financial landscape 
are Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch. 
The rating score goes to a top level of AAA until a default level of SD/D in accordance to the 
following table: 
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The credit quality of an enterprise entity or financial institution is not fixed and steady over a 
period of time, but it tends to undergo change to reflect alteration in creditworthiness. 
Credit ratings include the following activities:  
 Credit Risk Measurement & Monitoring; 
 identify, measure and monitor exposures to market, interest rate, liquidity and asset 
risks; 
 provide historical performance and underlying & cash flow projections based on credit 
models; 
 deliver detailed quantitative and qualitative reports highlighting drivers of performance. 
The rating process may be represented by the following scheme: 
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As regards the rating process of mutual banks, in Europe two categories of cooperative banking 
groups can be identified:  
 cooperative banking groups that have a central authority, combining treasury 
management with group strategic planning and compliance with European regulations. 
These groups (such as Rabobank and Crédit Agricole) have usually a strong contractual 
guarantee system and are viewed as a consolidated group for financial and regulatory 
purposes. The rating assigned to these highly integrated groups refer to the ability of 
that particular legal entity to meet its debt obligations reflecting the strength of the group 
as a whole. Indeed, for well-integrated and consolidated CBGs it is hard to separate the 
attributes of the single member banks from those of the group as a whole as the shared 
support mechanisms provide a solid link between the financial resources of each 
member with the financial health of the entire group making; 
 cooperative banking groups where the authority within the group is less centralised and 
is divided between central banks and powerful associations that claim responsibility in 
strategic planning, auditing, and the administration of support funds. The national 
regulator oversees each individual member bank and the groups’ support mechanisms 
are not based on cross-guarantee systems. This is the case of Italian BCCs. For these 
CBGs, the degree of cohesion and solidarity may vary significantly in comparison to 
the first group. Because of their characteristics, rating agencies believe that their ratings 
are driven more by credit quality than by the entity itself. However, even in this case 
the rating score reflects both the cooperative banks’ own strengths and their abilities to 
distribute financial resources within the group through internal guarantee systems. 
To sum up, it could be said that CRA’s rating procedures evaluate two main aspects: the 
integration level, considering the level of benefits that member banks receive being part of the 
group and if member banks would be supported by the group in case of financial distress.  
All the cooperative banking groups in Europe have developed some solidarity mechanisms. 
However, these mechanisms differ in their extent, nature, depth and coverage levels. 
Considering the extent and the nature of these guarantee systems, while individual banks benefit 
from the group rating as the support of the other member banks strengthen their financial 
flexibility, some entities may be excluded from solidarity agreements. Therefore CRA aim to 
determine first which entities are covered by the guarantee mechanism and in what measure. 
Then, it is important to understand how the mechanism works, if member banks are legally 
bound to provide support to other members or if it just a voluntary commitment, if the financial 
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resources are already available or if they are paid at the moment of the call. Indeed, by 
understanding the nature of the fund it is possible to evaluate the efficiency and the speed of 
the interventions.  Regarding the depth and coverage of the agreement, CRA aim to estimate 
how much money are available to support member banks. To do that, they have to take into 
consideration the extent to which member banks can contribute without compromising their 
own financial stability. Furthermore, it has to be evaluated the amount of resources it would be 
provided as the fund’s resources should be enough to meet the needs of member banks in 
financial distress. Also, it is important to understand if the agreement covers balance sheet and 
off-balance sheet liabilities and the timelines of its interventions to determine the financial 
circumstances that would imply the fund’s intervention and to evaluate whether they would be 
covered by the agreement. 
It is important to underline that the well-functioning of a guarantee mechanism requires a high 
level of strategic and managerial cohesiveness, strong business integration, and unified risk 
management. In order to achieve cohesiveness and solidarity within a group of independent 
banks, the group requires a transparent and accepted process for making strategic decisions 
developed by the group’s organizational bodies in order to ensure a common and coherent 
strategy and a homogeneous credit risk management within the whole group. To this purpose it 
is important for the group to have a monitoring process in place with an adequate level of 
internal reporting to review the implementation of the strategy. Another relevant aspect is 
represented by the extent to which the central organisation may intervene in group members, if 
they depart from group policy in their business (for example removing local executives in case 
they pursue different goals not aligned with the group’s strategy). 
Other elements that rating agencies take into consideration to assign their rating score may be 
classified in three broad categories: 
 Macro Profile;  
 Financial Profile;  
 Qualitative Profile. 
 
Macro Profile 
Though the macro profile, CRAs assess the system-wide factors that are likely to affect the 
propensity of banks to fail. Indeed, from several studies it has emerged that macro variables 
such as GDP growth, real interest rates and exchange rates significantly affect bank failure 
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rates. Furthermore, other relevant factors included in this profile are represented by the strength 
and reliability of a country’s institutions, its compliance with the national financial law and 
avoid corruption, the presence or absence of system-wide liquidity mechanisms or funding 
vulnerabilities, and structural advantages or deficiencies.   
The elements included in the macro profile are the following:  
 Economic strength:  
 Institutional strength; 
 Susceptibility to event risk; 
 Credit conditions; 
 Funding conditions; 
 Industry structure. 
 
Financial Profile 
The financial profile aims to determine a bank’s financial strength considering its solvency, its 
liquidity and its ability to generate cash flows. Indeed, a bank’s financial strength may be 
considered as a function of its solvency (indicated by its risk relative over its loss-absorbing 
capital) and its liquidity.  Instead, solvency can be defined as the combination of asset quality, 
leverage and earnings (the weaker and less predictable the asset quality, the higher the required 
returns), while liquidity is determined by a bank’s funding profile together with its ability to 
access cash (the less predictable the bank’s sources of funding, the larger the buffer of liquid 
assets required). It is important to highlight that all these variables are related to each other. In 
fact, a stronger capitalisation increases the capacity to absorb losses, increasing the confidence 
of counterparties and reducing the risk of liquidity problems.  In turn, greater liquidity levels 
enhance solvency (as a bank disposing of an adequate liquidity is less likely to need to sell 
illiquid assets in the event of a funding problem).   
Therefore, the financial profile is centred on the analysis of two main aspects: solvency and 
liquidity. The main financial ratios considered by this section are: 
 Asset Quality: Problem Loans / Gross Loans 
 Capital: Tangible Common Equity / Risk Weighted Assets 
 Profitability:  Net Income / Tangible Assets 
 Funding Structure:  Market Funds / Tangible Banking Assets 
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 Liquid Resources: Liquid Assets / Tangible Banking Assets 
 
Asset risk  
Asset risk is the measure of the degree of risk in the bank’s asset portfolio both in terms of 
banking and trading. It implies also the monitoring of assets volume and its evolution.  Risk 
policies of asset management are the most powerful indicators of bank risk. Great relevance is 
also given to risk concentrations and diversification as these aspects are considered a primary 
reason for bank failures. Another factor analysed by the asset risk is the complexity of assets 
that could come by the nature of assets or by their combination. 
Capital and Profitability  
Capital and profitability consider as first point the regulatory requirements the bank must fulfil. 
Secondly, it examines the Bank’s Risk Adjusted Capital Level Ratio (RAC) that compares the 
bank’s capital to its Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA). It represents a forward-looking evaluation 
of a bank’s ability to rebuild capital through its retained earnings.  
The third step is to consider the earning capacity. This aspect is based on the use of estimations 
for operating incomes and losses for a certain future period.  For this purpose, it is important to 
understand the key strategic factors likely to support future cash flow, and at the same time to 
identify critical factors that will inhibit them.  
Particular attention has also to be given to the sector-specific analysis, as specific risk factors 
likely to be weighed in the credit rating vary considerably by sector.  
In examining financial data, it is important to take into consideration both the economic reality 
of the underlying transactions and the differences in accounting conventions that may influence 
true economic values (for example, asset evaluations should be based on their ability to generate 
cash, not on the value stated in the balance sheet). 
 
Funding structure  
Funding structure aims to compare the bank’s funding mix with the domestic industry average. 
To do this, CRAs evaluate financial ratios such as loan-to-deposit ratio and long-term funding 
ratio. Rating committees examine a variety of possible scenarios. Their aim is to measure the 
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issuer's ability to meet debt obligations against economic scenarios reasonably adverse to the 
issuer’s specific circumstances.  
 
Liquidity resources 
Liquidity resources refer to the bank’s ability to manage its liquidity needs in case of adverse 
conditions. This aspect focuses on the degree of bank’s dependence on central banks liquidity 
facilities and on bank’s degree of access to other possible liquidity resources. The common 
ratios used to analyse liquidity are liquid-assets, wholesale-funding and liquid assets/core-
deposits. 
 
Qualitative Profile 
The financial profile also includes the supplementary analysis of other relevant qualitative 
considerations. Indeed, since ratings are thought to measure long-term risk, the rating process 
takes into consideration fundamental factors that will drive each issuer's long-term ability to 
meet debt payments (such as a change in management strategy or regulatory trends).  As credit 
ratings involve a look into the future, it is evident that they are by nature subjective. Because 
of this reason, they cannot be based exclusively on a defined set of financial ratios and rigid 
computer models. Rather, they are the product of a comprehensive analysis of each individual 
issue and issuer by experienced, well-informed, impartial credit analysts. Any attempt to reduce 
credit rating to a formulaic methodology would be misleading and would lead to serious 
mistakes. To this purpose, further elements have to be considered into the rating analysis, such 
as the business diversification level, the extent to which a bank’s inherent complexity may 
increase the risk of strategic errors and the corporate behaviour to evaluate whether a bank’s 
strategy, management or corporate policies may reduce or increase its overall risk profile. 
In sum, it could be said that a bank rating score includes an evaluation of the bank’s asset 
quality, its capital adequacy and level of earnings, the appropriateness of its funding structure 
and its capacity to access to liquid resources. A further quantitative analysis considers the 
calculation of financial ratios that allow to assess the context of the macro-economic and 
financial environment in which the bank operates. In the end, further qualitative variables are 
considered, including the business model, corporate behaviour and the degree of internal 
complexity to give a complete analysis of the bank’s financial scenario. 
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3.3 ANALYSIS OF BANK RECOVERY PLANS  
 
As a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008, a “core” function of banking supervision is 
represented by prudential vigilance that aims to increase the monitoring level of banks to allow 
a fast detection of financial issues and therefore to provide prompt measures to avoid financial 
crisis that may undermine the global financial system. The prudential rules have been 
determined by the Basel Committee for the banking vigilance and they have been applied by 
the European Community in order to develop a homogeneous functioning of the banking sector 
within Europe. The prudential methodologies are based on patrimonial requirements and on the 
internal control and monitoring of risks and operations that may affect the soundness of the 
financial institutions.  
The analysis of risks aims to determine the bank capacity to allocate efficiently its credits. 
Indeed, the risk measurement of a bank is linked to its attitude to select solvent clients, to 
finance profitable activities and to maintain an adequate diversification level47. 
The main banking risks to which correspond specific capital and liquidity requirements are: 
Credit Risk: the risk that the counterpart fails to fulfil its obligations to repay its debts and 
interests. The insolvency of a large number of clients may bring to large losses affecting the 
profitability level of the bank. 
Concentration Risk: an adequate diversification level has to be met by the bank’s activities in 
order to avoid that the concentration of credits toward a low number of clients undermine the 
soundness of the financial institutions. 
Interest Risk: a balance between interest incomes and expenses should be always guaranteed to 
avoid that a variation of the interest rates may negatively affect the bank profitability. 
Liquidity Risk: this risk may incur if a consistent number of clients decide to withdraw their 
funds at the same time as the bank would not have enough liquidity resources to face its 
obligations in the short time. 
Market Risk: this risk is linked to external factors that may impact the bank functioning, such 
as a negative trend of prices. 
                                                             
47 A.M. Tarantola, F. Parente, P.Rossi, 1996, La vigilanza sulle banche e sui gruppi bancari, Il Mulino. 
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As regards the capital requirements, in accordance with the Basel III, in addition to the 
minimum capital requirement equal to the 8% of the risk weighted assets a capital conservation 
buffer of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets has been established to ensure that banks dispose of a 
quota of capital promptly available to face situations of financial distress. This means that banks 
should accumulate capital during phases of economic growth and use this buffer in case of 
financial difficulties. Furthermore, countercyclical buffers have been introduced to prevent the 
amplification of cyclicality in the banking sector caused by excessive credit growth. The 
purpose is to protect the banking sector from losses deriving from the burst of bubbles and to 
ensure the availability of credit to the economy during times of financial distress. 
The liquidity and solvency requirements instead include the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), 
and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)48. The LCR (high-quality liquid assets/total net cash 
outflows over the next 30 days) aims at ensuring that banks have sufficient high quality liquid 
resources to face short-term stress scenario. The NSFR (available amount of stable 
funds/required amount of stable funds) aims at maintaining a more robust structural liquidity 
profile, by creating further incentives for banks to fund their balance sheets exposures with 
more stable sources of funding. In practice, the ratio requires a minimum amount of funding 
that is expected to be stable over a one-year horizon based on liquidity risk factors assigned to 
assets and off balance sheet liquidity exposures. 
Regarding the macro-prudential supervision, the goal is to timely detect areas of systemic risks 
and potential threats to financial stability and requires appropriate corrective interventions by 
competent authorities. Indeed, the micro-prudential supervision is not sufficient to ensure 
systemic stability of large banks that operate in complex interconnected financial landscapes 
with the consequent risks of propagation of the crisis at a systemic level, as demonstrated by 
the financial crisis. Therefore, it is important that both the micro and macro prudential 
supervision systems work together for ensuring a continuous and integrated risk-management 
approach and an efficient control. 
In accordance with the prudential vigilance, control of banking groups has to be exercised at 
consolidated level, specifying the methodologies used for the consolidation process and also at 
individual level. It is necessary for banks to dispose of an adequate internal organization and 
reliable control systems 49  to ensure a healthy and prudent management. The supervisory 
functions should be exercised in accordance with the principle of proportionality considering 
                                                             
48 Giuseppe Boccuzzi, Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica, Towards a new framework for banking crisis management. 
The international debate and the Italian model, Banca d’Italia, 2011. 
49 Directive 89/646/CEE. 
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the different types and sizes of financial institutions and to take more focused preventive 
intervention (for example, larger banks should expect a very intense supervision and they 
should be prepared at any moment to deal with a distressed situation that could take place both 
for internal and external problems). An appropriate design and implementation of corporate 
governance, organisational structure and operational processes as well as internal control 
system and procedures, plays a key role in detecting weaknesses and identifying effective 
interventions. Strengthening internal control is the essential for the well-functioning of the 
banks as no external control can be more effective than a good internal one.  
As stated by the Basel II, another key role is represented by stress tests that allow to evaluate 
the resilience of banks to adverse market conditions. They consist of assessing the effect on the 
bank’s risks of specific events (sensitivity analysis) or of the joint movement of a set of 
economic and financial variables using adverse scenarios hypotheses (scenario analysis). The 
choice of risk factors has to be related to the bank’s business; the construction of scenarios is 
also important as it could be too severe or too flexible, with consequent implications in terms 
of risk management. After the financial crisis of 2008, stress tests have become an ordinary tool 
of bank management and banking supervision, especially for large and complex financial 
institutions, determining in advance the degree of severity. 
Another important component of a crisis prevention framework is given by the “living wills50” 
approach consisting in the preparation by banks, (especially by large and complex financial 
institutions) of specific contingency plans thought to explain how they are supposed to deal 
with adverse conditions. The plans have to report all the actions that a bank intends to take to 
recover from weaknesses that affect the technical profiles of the bank (recovery plans) or to 
start a resolution procedure in the event that it should fail (resolution plans). Contingency plans 
could be considered a type of preventive planning of crisis resolutions and they have to be 
continuously updated under the supervision of supervisory authorities. The ‘living wills’ 
principle may require banks to reorganise and simplify their corporate structures by separating 
business lines or activities making a clear distinction of banking operations in order to facilitate 
their selling to third parties in case of crisis. Critics of living wills claim that it might imply a 
return to a world of national markets in order to make things simpler for the authorities. Others 
claim that such wills may prevent a bank from entering into new lines of business or expand its 
                                                             
50 C. Goodharth, How should we regulate bank capital and financial products? What role for “living wills”, in The 
Future of Finance, The LSE Report, 2010 
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operations.  However, dealing with the “too-big-to-fail”  problem  or  “too-interconnected-to-
fail”  problem  reducing banks complexity may be an advantage51.   
The contingency plans may take the form of a “recovery liquidity plan” or “recovery capital 
plan” providing a clear identification of the decision-making process and the execution of the 
plan also including the timeframe for the plan development.  
The recovery liquidity plan could be considered a funding plan, thought to help banks to deal 
with liquidity distress. The plan should include all information, readily available, about liquidity 
holdings (such as treasury bonds, and marketable assets) as well as the availability of collaterals 
for ordinary and emergency liquidity facilities by central banks. 
Instead, the recovery capital plan is aimed at “derisking” the banking group52. This means that 
banks have to be prepared to liquidate part of their portfolios as well as selling part of their 
business lines in emergency situations. Another possibility for banks is to include in their 
recovery plans how they may be able to raise capital from private investors. This capital must 
be debt convertible in ordinary loss-absorbing equity when a bank is hit by distress. 
Furthermore, banks must prepare a resolution plan to ensure that if the bank is failing, or is 
likely to fail, the situation could be rapidly resolved or liquidated. Supervisory authorities 
should assess whether the proposed arrangements are credible, realistic and effective to restore 
the financial stability of the bank. If they are not satisfied by the bank’s proposal they can ask 
to modify the plans.  
Contingency plans are based on early intervention systems that aim to identify the appropriate 
triggering indicator for interventions. In accordance with the Article 9 of the Directive 
2014/59/EU, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has the mandate to issue guidelines to 
specify the minimum list of quantitative and qualitative indicators for the purposes of banks 
recovery planning. The proposed guidelines have been developed within the framework 
established by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. In particular, this Directive requires to 
banks to establish recovery plans which set out measures they would adopt to restore long-term 
                                                             
51 ESFRC (European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee), Dealing with problem banks in Europe, 22nd  June 
1998. 
52 Giuseppe Boccuzzi, Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica, Towards a new framework for banking crisis management. 
The international debate and the Italian model, Banca d’Italia, 2011. 
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financial stability in case of severe distress and to set up a special banking crisis management 
and resolution regime dealing with a wide landscape of problem situations53.  
The framework of recovery plan indicators provided by EBA54 should be: 
 adapted  to  the  business  model  and  strategy  of  an  institution  and  be  adequate  to  
its  risk profile; 
 adequate  to  the  size  and  complexity  of  each  institution.  In  particular,  the  number  
of  indicators  should  be  sufficient  to  alert  the  institution  of deteriorating  conditions  
in  a  variety  of  areas; 
 aligned with the overall risk management framework and with the existing liquidity or 
capital and business continuity plan indicators; 
 integrated into the governance of the institution and within the decision-making 
procedures and include forward looking indicators. 
The specific indicators55 per category required by the EBA are listed in the following table:   
                                                             
53 The US Prompt Corrective Action (U.S. Code, Title 12, Chapter 16), operating since 1991, is a useful reference 
model of a system of mandated corrective action. It is based on five capital thresholds for capitalised, 
undercapitalised, significantly undercapitalise and critically undercapitalised. Corrective measures include a broad 
range of requirements and restrictions such as suspension of dividend payments, restriction of asset growth, 
compulsory recapitalisation and, when a bank is critically undercapitalised, authorities are obliged to close it, and 
this happens when the bank has not entirely lost its capital. 
54 EBA Recovery Planning, Comparative Report on Governance Arrangements and Recovery Indicators, 5th July 
2016. 
55 EBA Recovery Planning, Comparative Report on Governance Arrangements and Recovery Indicators, 5th July 
2016. 
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Furthermore, in every supervisory system, supervisory authorities should have enough powers 
and responsibilities to intervene timely and effectively. Among powers recognized to 
supervisory authorities the main ones regard requiring banks to take actions to raise their 
capital, to restrict their business and limit their operations, to restrict distributions to 
shareholders and to require intra-group financial support according to voluntary agreements 
reached at group level and taking. Additional powers may regard replacing board members and 
directors if necessary and imposing frequent reporting requirements. 
To conclude we could say that the first objective in banking crisis management is the protection 
of financial stability maintaining confidence in the banking system. Indeed, in periods of 
financial crisis a lack of trust may lead to bank runs deepening the crisis and affecting the whole 
banking system. Therefore, in cases of financial instability restoring confidence is the first goal 
to pursue for supervisory authorities and the early detection of financial issues becomes of 
fundamental importance in order to avoid financial troubles and contagion effects on other 
institutions or on the whole market. 
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3.4 WHAT PRINCIPLES SHOULD THE CONTRACT OF COHESION 
INCLUDE? 
 
In light of the financial principles provided by the FITD, by the rating agencies and by the 
Banking Recovery Plans, I will try to individuate the key elements that the cohesion contract 
should take into consideration for the well-functioning of the banking group. 
So far, a working paper has been provided by Federcasse that should be considered an initial 
track for the formation of the final cohesion contract. In accordance to this first draft, the 
cohesion contract should be structured in two main sections. The first part should be dedicated 
to the duties and responsibilities of the holding company. It is highlighted that the leader of the 
CBG remains subject to the compliance with the mutual aims and the entrepreneurial autonomy 
of the individual BCCs, in addition, the management and coordination activities of the parent 
company must be developed to a service perspective for the member BCCs. At the same time, 
the holding is required to meet all the necessary capital and control constraints in order to ensure 
the healthy and prudent management of the whole group. Instead, the second section should 
focus on the risk assessment of the single BCCs. A set of management indicators should be 
provided to monitor the main operational areas of the bank, such as: capital and profitability, 
asset quality, liquidity and mutualistic functions. The evaluation of thresholds and weights and 
regulations of further specific areas are still under discussion. 
Taking into consideration this first track, I will try to deepen the details of these two sections 
on the base of the information gathered through the previous paragraphs. 
As said before, the first part of the cohesion contract has to be focused on the role of the holding, 
regulating in particular all its coordination and direction functions. From the analysis of the 
banking groups’ regulations a relevant role is recognized to the central institution. Indeed, in 
accordance with the vigilance dispositions of the Bank of Italy, the holding company plays a 
role of strategic summit of the group56. It can require data and information to the other member 
banks, it gives an organizational structure to the group and to the execution of its functions and 
it exercises a strategic control.  
As regards the direction functions, the regulation refers to the direction process of the firms, 
articulated in the following phases: planning and programming, organization, coordination and 
                                                             
56 Banca d’Italia, Istruzioni di Vigilanza per le banche, Sezione III, “…La capogruppo deve dare al gruppo una 
organizzazione che le consenta l’effettivo controllo sia sulle scelte strategiche del gruppo...”. 
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control57. This process is applied either to single companies either to groups of firms. In case 
of groups, in particular of banking groups, the direction activity affects the entire group and it 
is of competence of the holding.  
The planning and programming phase may be defined as the process through which the 
objectives of the group are determined and how the firm intends to pursue them. The planning 
function is defined strategic if it is referred to the long period, while operative if it is developed 
for the short period. Within the banking group two levels of hierarchy are identified: a corporate 
level in charge of taking the strategic decisions regarding the entire group and a business level 
that aims to guarantee the competitive advantage of each member bank (that may be identified 
as Strategic Business Units)58 . In the banking group, the development of the corporate strategy 
is developed by the holding that is in charge to issue dispositions and instructions to ensure the 
homogeneous implementation of the strategic measures throughout the whole organization 
including the power to select and discharge components of administration bodies of member 
banks if necessary to safeguard the unity of the group 59 . This aspect opens the issue of 
coordination between the holding and the subsidiaries. In a group characterized by a high 
integration level, controlled banks see their managerial and organizational autonomy limited by 
the constraints required by the holding. However, it is important to underline that the strategy 
at corporate level is not imposed by the holding but it is based on a contractual regulation 
determined in accordance with the other member banks (cohesion contract). The planning phase 
includes also an analysis of the internal and external environment in which the group operates60. 
The internal analysis regards the identification of strengths and weaknesses of the organization 
itself and it is therefore based on an internal information system. This explains the information 
requirements of controlled banks to submit continuous data to the central institution. Instead, 
the external analysis implies an evaluation of the opportunities and threats that the group has to 
consider on the formation of its strategy. The analysis of the external environment includes also 
the regulation dimension and its evolution that of course may consistently affect the banking 
group functioning.  
Following, the organization phase has the goal to determine the procedures of decision, control 
and execution, assigning the respective competences and responsibilities to each area. In 
                                                             
57 Pennisi Roberto, Attivitá di direzione e poteri della capogruppo nei gruppi bancari, Giappichelli Editore. 
58 Pennesi Roberto, Attivitá di Direzione e Poteri della Capogruppo nei Gruppi Bancari, Giappichelli Editore. 
59A preliminary consultancy phase of the holding is required for the nomination of the components of the internal 
administrative bodies. A simplification of internal nomination processes of member banks ‘components may be 
required to increase the efficacy and efficiency of the group’s functions. 
60 Porter, “The essence of formulating competitive strategy is relating a company to its environment”. 
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accordance with the vigilance dispositions of the Bank of Italy, the structure of the group is 
decided by the holding that has to evaluate the most suitable structure for the strategy it intends 
to pursue, furthermore, the group structure has to be efficient and to meet the regulation 
requirements imposed by the Bank of Italy61 . The banking groups’ structure requires the 
formation of homogeneous internal bodies to allow the group to benefit from synergies under 
the operational, technological aspects and scale economies. Common is the establishment of 
sub-holdings inside the groups in order to follow specific operative units. Therefore, it is 
important that the contract of cohesion provides a regulation of the relationships among the 
internal bodies of the different organizational levels.  
As regards the coordination phase, it is the one that allows to realize the programs and to put 
them in place. Hence, it is necessary to guide and coordinate the activities of the different areas 
in order to ensure a homogeneous implementation of the programs. The coordination phase is 
strictly linked to the planning one, as it includes the coordination of forces, resources and factors 
thought to motivate employees. It is clear that this phase requires a large flow of information 
from the top toward the down of the group (as employees have to be informed of the objectives 
decided at the top level). In the banking groups, the information are communicated by the top 
through the issuance of dispositions and instructions that managers of the single areas have to 
implement. This in turn implies that the efficacy of the coordination at group level is given by 
the capacity of the holding to direct and influence the member banks62. In most of the cases, the 
direction functions inside the banking groups are developed by administrators however, in some 
cases specific bodies are formed to deal with the controlled institutions.  
The next and last phase of the management process, is the one of control that aims to monitor 
the progresses that the group is doing toward the fixed objectives. The control function is 
strongly linked to all the other previous phases as its goal is to ensure the well-functioning of 
the planning, organizational and coordination activities. The control activity starts fixing some 
parameters to which the group has to compliance. If the results differ from the parameters, it is 
necessary to individuate the causes of such divergence promptly detecting financial threats and 
providing fast interventions. The banking regulation requires to banking groups two types of 
controls, the strategic one focused on the analysis of the competitive scenario and the control 
of the group’s performances that have to be aligned to the group’s objectives.  
                                                             
61 Banca d’Italia, Istruzioni di Vigilanza per le Banche, Sezione IV, Art. 4. 
62 Pennisi Roberto, Attivitá di direzione e poteri della capogruppo nei gruppi bancari, Giappichelli Editore. 
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The financial stability of the banking group refers to the vigilance of the Bank of Italy that 
issues specific instructions in the group’s interest, limiting the direction powers of the holding. 
The holding, in turn, has to exercise its functions on the base of the principles of fairness and 
reasonableness in order to guarantee the financial stability of the group63. In accordance with 
the fairness principle, the holding is required to provide an equal distribution of duties among 
the member banks. However, this principle leads to several issues as not always it can be applied 
(for instance, if the holding has to reduce the exposure of the group toward a specific client and 
it is individuated a single institution that has to proceed to this reduction, it is impossible to ask 
to other banks to take these measures). The concept of reasonableness instead regards the 
coherency among the measures taken by the holding and their alignment with the group’s goals. 
From several doctrines it has emerged that the sacrifices imposed by the holding to member 
banks may be compensated by the advantages deriving from the group’s activity for the 
controlled banks. However, this assertion is based on the concept that to the sustained sacrifices 
correspond equal advantages. Therefore, the holding is required to implement strategies that 
take into consideration that sacrifices asked to controlled banks have to be compensated by 
adequate advantages. As regards the expenses faced by the holding for the direction of the 
group, the law defines this activity of competence of the holding and therefore the expenses 
cannot be spread among the member institutions but they have to be afforded by the central 
institution64. 
Another important aspect regards the funding mechanism based on a cross-guarantee system 
aimed to provide fast access to capital markets to ensure the prompt recapitalization of member 
banks in financial distress. It is also required to adopt an efficient monitoring system in order 
to promptly detect financial threats and provide fast interventions. The cross-guarantee system 
commits all member banks both in a vertical sense (from the holding to the BCCs) and 
horizontal sense (BCCs among each other’s). The guarantee commitment of single banks is 
commensurate with available capital resources of each bank and limited to the amount of assets 
exceeding regulatory capital requirements at individual level (free capital). This kind of 
guarantee has a double function. An external function as it provides a guarantee in favour of 
creditors in case of breach of obligations of a member bank, and an internal one as it represents 
a mechanism of inter-group financial support aimed to prevent the insolvency of any member 
bank. An ex ante constitution of specific buffer of capital at the holding as a measure of intra-
group sustain are required in order to guarantee the effective availability of funds (TIER1). 
                                                             
63 Banca d’Italia, Disposizioni di Vigilanza per le Banche, Art. 61. 
64 G. Scognamiglio “Gruppo” e “Controllo”. 
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Each member BCC has to participate to “promptly available funds” in proportion to its RWA 
and in the limit of its free capital. 
As stated by Federcasse, the second section of the cohesion contract should focus on the risk 
assessment of each member BCC and to the determination of the main financial indicators that 
should be taken into consideration. On the base of the financial ratios provided by the financial 
institutions considered in the previous paragraphs, the main areas and indicators that should be 
included in the cohesion contract are: 
Capital indicators: 
 The Tier 1 capital ratio. It compares a banking firm’s core equity capital to total risk-
weighted assets. It provides the measure of a bank’s financial strength based on the sum 
of its equity capital and disclosed reserves. Instead, a firm’s risk-weighted assets 
includes all assets that the firm holds that are systematically weighted for credit risk.  
Risk-weighted assets are used to determine the minimum amount of capital that must 
be held by banks and other institutions to reduce the risk of insolvency.  
The capital requirement is based on a risk assessment for each type of bank asset. 
In accordance with the Basel III, a firm must have a Tier 1 capital ratio of 6% or greater 
to be classified as well-capitalized. 
 
 The Tier 1 leverage ratio: is calculated by dividing Tier 1 capital ratio by the firm’s 
average total consolidated assets. This ratio helps to determine the capital adequacy and 
to place constraints on the degree to which a banking firm can leverage its capital base. 
Holding banks need to have a Tier 1 leverage ratio equal to 3%, while other banks can 
arrive to 4%. 
 
 The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, divided by the 
sum of risk-weighted assets. It aims to ensure that banks have enough cushion to absorb 
a reasonable amount of losses before they become insolvent and consequently lose 
depositors’ funds.   
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As regards asset quality indicators a great attention has to be given to Non Performing Loans 
(NPL) that is the sum of borrowed money upon which the debtor has not made his scheduled 
payments for at least 90 days. A nonperforming loan is expected to enter default. If a bank  
Profitability and liquidity indicators:  
 The return on assets (ROA) ratio is the main profitability indicator that illustrates how 
well management is employing the company's total assets to make a profit.  
The higher the return, the more efficient the management of resources.                                                               
The ROA ratio is calculated by comparing net income to average total assets, and is 
expressed as a percentage: 
 
 
 The return on equity ratio (ROE) measures how much the shareholders earned for their 
investment in the company.  
The higher the ratio percentage, the more efficient is the management of the equity of 
the company and the better return is to investors: 
 
 
 The loan-to-deposit ratio (LTD) is used to assess a bank’s liquidity by dividing the banks 
total loans by its total deposits:  
                                                    LTD  = 
  
If the ratio is too high, it means that banks might not have enough liquidity to cover 
unforeseen fund requirements; if the ratio is too low, banks may not be earning as much 
as they could be.  
Loans in the numerator of the formula are investments or assets of a bank.  
Instead, deposits in the denominator can be considered the same as debts as the 
individual depositors are granting monies to the bank with a return equal to the deposit 
rates and that can be called upon at any time. 
In addition to these key financial indicators, of great relevance are the contributions of the 
methodologies of risk measurement and assessment of capital adequacy, among which the main 
Loans 
Deposits 
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ones are represented by the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process and by the Risk 
Appetite Framework. 
 
ICAAP 
In their activities, banks require to be compensated for the resources that they invest to offer 
their services. This compensation is linked to the entrepreneurial risk undertaken by them. 
Therefore management system to identify and take on well-priced risks becomes ever more 
important in today’s competitive banking market. In accordance with the Basel II, banks are 
asked to implement an Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) that focuses 
on capital management in order to ensure the capital adequacy of the bank. The Basel 
Committee defines economic capital as the methods or practices that allow banks to attribute 
capital to cover the economic effects of risk-taking activities.  
As stated by the Basel II, the capital management function has to consider the capital supply 
side given by the balance-sheet capital (Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3) and the capital demand 
determined by the regulatory capital for credit risk, market risk, and operational risk accounts. 
In addition, the capital management function should consider the valuation methods of rating 
agencies, which base their ratings mostly on Tier 1 capital on the capital supply side. 
Furthermore, the capital management function has to consider simultaneously the economic 
view of matching the capital supply (risk-taking capacity) with the capital demand (economic 
capital)65. Capital supply includes mainly planned capital transactions and expected profits 
whereas capital demand is mainly driven by business plans and by risk-profile forecasts in 
combination with macro-economic scenarios. Since the requirements for both regulatory and 
economic capital have to be fulfilled, banks have to define possible solutions in case of 
conflicting requirements for regulatory and economic capital.  
The ICAAP considers: the comprehensive risk assessment of material risks by measuring 
economic capital (the measurement of economic capital comprises collection of all necessary 
data), the determination of risk-taking capacity comparing economic capital with its risk-taking 
capacity (risk-taking capacity is derived from accounting items), the capital adequacy 
maintenance aligned with frequent and efficient internal controlling and reporting activities 
thought to continuously monitor and assess the adequacy of management methods and 
processes to the risk profile of the bank. It is of responsibility of the Board of Directors and of 
                                                             
65 KPMG, Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Policy. 
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Senior Managers to oversee the ICAAP by establishing well defined risk management strategies 
and guidelines. 
 
RAF 
A fundamental part of the financial profile is determined by the internal controls and 
information systems that provide a set of early warning indicators to monitor the risk level of 
the member BCCs. In this section, great relevance is given to the implementation of risk 
assessment methodologies. As stated by the Bank of Italy, it is of the holding competence the 
determination of the Risk Appetite Framework (RAF)66.  
The  RAF  sets  the financial  institution’s risk  profile and  contributes to development  of  the 
institution’s strategy  and determination  of the  risks undertaken in relation to the institution’s 
risk capacity. The Risk Appetite may be defined as the aggregate level and types of risk a 
financial institution is willing to assume within its risk capacity to achieve its strategic 
objectives and business plan67. It also determines the maximum level of risk the financial 
institution can assume given its current level of resources before breaching constraints (risk 
capacity) and the tolerance risk thresholds that fix the maximum allowed deviation for the risk 
appetite. The risk tolerance thresholds are fixed to levels that would allow banks to exercise 
their operations within their risk capacity even in stress conditions.  
Among the elements considered by the RAF, the main ones are: the business nature, the target 
market, the number of high-risk clients, the jurisdiction to which it is exposed, the internal audit 
and the volume size of its transactions. An effective RAF should provide a common framework 
and comparable measures across the financial institution for managers and the board directors 
to communicate and assess the types and level of risk that they are willing to accept. RAF 
explicitly defines the boundaries within which management is expected to operate when 
pursuing the institution’s business strategy. An effective implementation of this procedure 
requires the incorporation of the RAF into the decision-making process and into the institution-
wide risk management framework together with its communication throughout the 
organisation, starting from the top. The RAF should be continuously monitored and assessed 
by the internal audit on an institution-wide basis as well as on an individual business line and 
legal entity basis in order to ensure a constant alignment of the RAF to the institution’s strategy 
                                                             
66 Circolare n. 263, 27th December 2006. 
67 Financial Stability Board, Principles for an effective Risk Appetite Framework, 2013. 
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and to guarantee prompt corrective measures. For this purpose, continuous information flows 
are required by member BCCs and if necessary, the holding may require them the application 
of integrative information systems to guarantee the reliability and the correctness of the 
determined risk levels. 
To sum up, it could be said that the contract of cohesion is the tool that allows BCCs to adhere 
to the CBG, accepting to be subject to the direction and coordination functions of the holding. 
It also states the responsibilities and duties corresponding to holding’s role in charge of the 
strategic and operative direction of the group, regulating the strategic goals, the valuation 
principles and the risk measurement procedures to ensure the alignment of the single banks’ 
internal procedures with the overall group’s activity. For this purpose, the internal control 
functions of the member BCCs are externally exercised by the holding that also establishes the 
criteria for member institutions’ activities (with reference to the grant of loans and to the level 
of risk exposure). The mutual nature of the group is protected by the art. 37-bis TUB in 
accordance to which the adhesion to the CBG does not compromise the exercise of BCCs 
mutual functions. Among the main powers of the holding we find the management of the group 
and of its internal bodies, internal control functions aimed to ensure the respect of the prudential 
financial requirements and the power of intervention on the affiliates even applying sanctions 
if necessary. The holding ensures the financial stability of the group trough an efficient early 
warning system including the development of homogenous financial indicators together with 
valuation and risk assessment methodologies (such as ICAAP and RAF) throughout the whole 
group. As regards the aspects non-regulated by the cohesion contract, member BCCs maintain 
their contractual autonomy (the autonomy degree of single BCCs is calculated on a risk based 
approach and each single BCC maintains its own managerial autonomy in the limit of the 
operating agreements established with the holding). The agreement among the member banks 
is based on a system of cross guarantees that aims to mobilize the intra-group financial 
resources in case of necessity, allowing, in this way, to comply with the prudential rules 
provided for banks. A high capital disposal and the possibility to recur quickly to the market 
are preliminary to the ability to maintain and increase the support of the economy, other than 
to finance the necessary investments that otherwise the single BCCs would not be able to face 
individually. Moreover, the centralization of the common functions are necessary to realize cost 
synergies and to increase the offer of products and services improving the ability of self-
financing of the whole group. 
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CHAPTER 4 –THE COOPERATIVE BANKING GROUP MODEL: 
EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
  
4.1 THE CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE REFORM 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, the current reform aims to develop the Italian 
cooperative banking sector around the figure of the cooperative banking group. The reform may 
be developed in two possible ways: 
 establishment of two cooperative banking groups, a large one under Iccrea holding and 
a provincial one under Cassa Centrale Raiffeisen; 
 establishment of a further group under Cassa Centrale Banca (that therefore would not 
join the group of Iccrea holding). 
Let’s deepen the profiles of these cooperative banks. 
Iccrea Holding S.p.A. with 400 BCCs and more than five million clients is the biggest 
cooperative group in Italy. It is structured in three main areas (Institutional, Corporate and 
Retail) and it is formed for the 49% by subsidiaries and including a holding, Iccrea, that in turn 
owns shares in Iccrea Banca and Iccrea Gestione Crediti.  Because of its large dimensions and 
its important network is considered to be the most suitable bank to cover the role of holding 
company of the Italian cooperative banking group. 
Cassa Centrale Raiffeisen, instead, has always been considered a particular financial institution 
because of its territorial, cultural and linguistic characteristics. It includes 47 BCCs of the 
Bolzano area. Its activities are developed for the 72,5% within the province of Bolzano while 
for the 27,5% out of its province (including also its participation in an Austrian bank). The same 
situation recurs for the BCCs in the Bolzano area located in proximity to the border that, because 
of their location, have extended their activities out of the province of their competence. 
Therefore, we can understand that the territorial constraint provided by the reform would 
negatively affect these institutions leading to the loss of the portion of their activities provided 
out of the province of Bolzano. The formation of a provincial group would allow to Cassa 
Raiffeisen to maintain its clients. Indeed, in accordance with the provinciality criteria, the 
holding of the group is required to have its legal basis and its subsidiaries within the province 
of its competence but no limits are fixed for the area of exercise of its operations. The objective 
of this exception is align with the cooperative nature of the institutions as it would allow the 
group to access to further markets for the benefit of the member BCCs. 
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As regards Cassa Centrale Banca (CCB), it is the second biggest mutual bank in Italy after 
Iccrea and it is considered the ‘head’ of the north-east of Italy. It is a banking group established 
in 2007. It is formed by a holding company Centrale Finanziaria del Nord Est S.p.A. and by 
Cassa Centrale Banca-Credito Cooperativo del Nord Est that in turn owns shares in other 
institutions (Centrale Credit & Real Estate Solutions, Centrale Leasing Nord Est and Centrale 
Soluzioni Immobiliari). The holding, Centrale Finanziaria del Nord Est SpA has been created 
to maintain the control of Credito Cooperativo del Nord Est in Cassa Centrale Banca. It is 
owned for the 78% by the Casse Rurali Trentine, for the 20% by the Banche di Credito 
Cooperativo del Veneto and of Friuli Venezia Giulia and for the 2% by cooperatives of the 
Cooperazione Trentina. Cassa Centrale Banca instead is owned for the 68% by the holding, for 
the 25% by DZ Bank AG, and for the 6% from business associates and for the remaining 1% 
form other BCCs and Casse Rurali. 
The structure of BCC is represented as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial proposal of the BCC reform argued to include CCB under the group of Iccrea 
holding. However, CCB has not completely agreed with this deal and it has proposed the 
creation of its own group. Because of its relevant role covered in the Italian financial sector, 
CCB’s proposal is linked to the necessity to maintain its full autonomy to continue to ensure 
the protection of the local communities and to enforce the strong relationships of trust and 
networks that have been built through the years. CCB has not excluded the option to join 
Iccrea’s group but it has asked in exchange a large share of the capital of the holding together 
with a representation in the management and administration bodies (another condition asks to 
shift the legal basis of the group to Milan but this requirement will not probably be met as Iccrea 
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is from Rome). Its proposal has been taken into consideration. Federcasse is evaluating this 
possibility but until an agreement is not signed with Iccrea holding all the scenarios are still 
open. 
To sum up, the new financial landscape would include a main large group under Iccrea holding 
and a provincial group in Bolzano represented by Cassa Centrale Raiffeisen. What is still under 
discussion is the position of Cassa Centrale Banca that has expressed its will to create another 
group, but at the same time the option to join Iccrea holding is not excluded. As a final 
agreement has not been founded yet, both the streets are still possible.  
As we have seen previously, the provincial groups will see their activities limited to their 
provinces (the activities developed outside of their competence territory cannot exceed the 5% 
of their total operations) while all the other BCCs (except the three institutions that have opted 
for the way-out) are thought to join the group of Iccrea holding.  
But what do BCCs think about this reform? 
BCCs seem to be quite sceptical about the reform. The main critical aspect regards the 
governance of the holding. Indeed, especially the well-managed BCCs are worried that the 
administration of the group will be assigned to large BCCs managed by who has not developed 
a good management of its own BCCs. Even the functioning of the cross-guarantee system is 
not well defined yet, this makes BCCs sceptical about the efficiency of the new system. The 
flow of resources throughout the group must be well regulated in a proportional way, even 
regarding the advantages distribution derived from its activities.   
Another risk is to create a cooperative banking group too large that may lead the member BCCs 
to lose their mutual nature and their territorial feature. It is important to remember that their 
relevant role in the current financial scenario has been given thanks to their role close to their 
territory. The relevant influence exercised by their shareholders and clients has allowed BCCs 
to take key management decisions and to provide always more appropriate services to local 
communities.  
A further aspect that has not to be undervalued regards the negative effects on the employment 
level of these banks. BCCs will have to go through complex reorganization processes to 
eliminate bodies that exercise the same functions or structures whose activities have been 
transferred under the holding competences. 
BCCs complain that if the reform is not well developed it will lead to several problems such as 
a large restriction of the BCCs’ autonomy, high coordination and reorganization costs, loss of 
the territorial feature and decrease of profitability of the individual institutions. The competence 
and mentality of the governance are considered to be key elements in the group management. 
Therefore, managers should come from the soundest BCCs and also, they should change 
periodically in order to ensure a prudent and healthy management of the group. The cooperative 
banking group should represent an opportunity for each member BCC to enforce itself and to 
strengthen its role in the territory, guaranteeing higher reliability and higher solvency levels.  
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The pros and cons of the reform are not visible yet as everything is still being developed. 
However, we can start to see the first effects as since January 2016 until the end of July 2016 
the number of BCCs is decreased from 366 to 337 and it is expected to decrease until 300 by 
the end of the year. Moreover, since the end of June 2016, the Temporary Compulsory Fund 
has become operative providing support for mergers between BCCs. In particular, its 
interventions are thought to provide financial support to BCCs in acquisitions processes so that 
the acquiring bank does not incur in financial distress as a consequence of the acquisition.  
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4.2 ONE OR TWO COOPERATIVE BANKING GROUPS? 
 
As said previously, Cassa Centrale Banca has proposed to form a second CBG under the holding 
Cassa Centrale Banca that will have to meet the 1 billion capital threshold. The objective of 
CCB is to create a modern banking network able to compete at international level thanks to its 
levels of profits, its efficiency and its risk management. The level of autonomy of member 
BCCs would be proportional to their soundness and it would be determined on the base of a 
rating model developed in accordance with a risk-based approach. It has specified that the 
majority of its members will be institutions with high ratings and only few BCCs with low 
creditworthiness will be included. Other proposals of CCB regard the adhesion to the Fondo 
Interbancario Tutela di Depositi (instead of to the Fondo di Garanzia dei Depositanti) as normal 
banks and the increase of the limit of the amount of shares that can be owned by single 
shareholders from 10% to 25-30% in order to attract new shareholders even at international 
level. At the moment 15 BCCs have expressed the will to join CCB’s group, but CCB estimates 
to reach a minimum of 91 members for a total of 1,187 branches, with a total capital ratio greater 
than 15%. 
But what could be the impact of the creation of a second group in the Italian cooperative sector?   
First, let’s try to understand why Cassa Centrale Banca is reluctant to join Iccrea holding. The 
reasons given to justify CCB’s resistance about the formation of a unique cooperative banking 
group are more political than economical. Indeed, in the past Trentino-Alto Adige has always 
been subject to a strong Austrian influence that has left significant cultural and ideological 
roots. Because of these reasons, Trentino-Alto Adige has always maintained its autonomy 
through the years, having also a special statute. Its local communities have a different mentality 
from the rest of Italy and especially from Rome.  
CCB aims that by creating its own group it would see its autonomy more guaranteed without 
compromising its mutual nature and its networks. The 15 BCCs that argue to join CCB’s group 
are solid and well-managed institutions with 156 branches in the national territory, 1.107 
employees, own funds equal to 709 million euro, a total capital of 8,8 billion euro and a 
patrimonial ratio equal to 17,1%. In their appeal to the Italian Parliament, they have asked an 
appropriate vigilance over the correct implementation of the reform as they are worried to be 
deprived of their autonomy and to be transformed in tools of Federcasse. 
Another CCB’s concern is that the holding’s governance located in Rome may be less efficient 
respect its standards and that it may be influenced by the politic that could be addressed to 
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pursue different interests from those thought for the prudent and healthy management of the 
member BCCs. Indeed, often in Italy, the governance of these financial institutions has 
appeared to be related to political interests that do not secure efficiency in financial markets nor 
at the level of individual financial intermediaries. Instead, they are likely to lead to a 
misallocation of funds, impairing the effective functioning of the markets and bringing in 
second plan the mutual values. This political influence in most of the cases makes BCCs to take 
on higher risks and a higher financial exposure dramatically increasing the risk to incur in 
financial distress. 
A further aspect regards that belonging to a large network implies that some counterparts may 
behave opportunistically by applying risky strategies and by appropriating part of the benefits 
generated within the alliance (as the term “cooperation” is also defined as mutual cooperation 
between “self-oriented” actors). Therefore, efficient control mechanisms are needed to detect 
similar problems and timely prevent them from occurring as an opportunistic behaviour of only 
few members could have negative effects on the entire cooperative credit system. 
What would be the advantages of joining Iccrea’s group for Cassa Centrale Banca? 
By joining Iccrea holding CCB may have consistent advantages either under the security point 
of view, either as regards economic opportunities. 
As the main goal of the CBG is to use the financial resources of sound BCCs to support the 
weak ones, CCB and well-managed BCCs do not want to risk to find themselves in an adverse 
position and to get weaken by a wrong implementation of the cross-guarantee mechanism. 
However, establishing a unique large-size group would allow to spread financial risks among a 
larger number of banks, reducing the financial impact on each institution. In a globalized world 
companies are exposed to high market risks as they have to face global competition that in turn 
increases BCCs’risks to incur in financial distress. Therefore, even the soundest BCCs would 
benefit from operating under a unique CBG as they would be supported by a larger financial 
network. Large dimensions and high diversification levels are essential characteristics to 
survive in a globalized economy. Also, the holding would dispose of larger amounts of financial 
resources and it would be able to better guarantee the respect of prudential thresholds. 
Another advantage regards the economic opportunities in terms of know-how, innovative 
processes, technology and infrastructures at network level. Further benefits would derive also 
from a decrease in management costs due to the rationalization of internal bodies whose 
functions have been transferred to the holding. The presence of two groups would imply a 
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double organization (in terms of internal bodies, control mechanisms, number of employees) 
and therefore double costs for the financial sector. Furthermore, there would be the risk that the 
two groups would not develop homogeneous assessment methodologies, internal controls and 
auditing procedures leading to vigilance and control issues. 
A further opportunity for CCB would be represented by the exploitation of possible synergies 
arising from the cooperative network that would bring to benefits in terms of efficiency, profits, 
growth and business expansion.  
As regards the mutual values and the territoriality issue, the reform provides proportional 
autonomy constraints on the base of the risk level of each member institution. This means that 
efficient and well-managed BCCs as in the case of CCB would not see significant restrictions 
of their autonomy while they would obtain more benefits from the group’s activity. Therefore, 
BCC’s local presence is not threaten by the new regulation instead they may be able to run their 
local activities in autonomy seeing themselves enforced by a sounder structure that in turn 
would increase clients ‘trust.  
Another critic has been done about the fact that the unique CBG would represent a case of 
monopoly. However, as individual BCCs will maintain their autonomy this is not a real risk. 
The holding would be in charge of the direction and coordination of the group, while the 
operations at local level would remain under the competence of the local BCCs without altering 
the current competition.  
In conclusion, I would say that coordinating around 300 autonomous BCCs under a unique 
group would be very delicate and complex especially in absence of previous experiences in this 
sector. The reform proposed by the Bank of Italy seems to be oriented to the short-run, open to 
future possible adjustments once that the main changes will be developed in accordance with 
the new regulation.  
The complexity of the reform’s implementation requires a gradual process that brings the Italian 
cooperative banking structure toward a unification path through mergers and acquisitions. 
Then, the process should lead to the formation of a high integrated cooperative banking group 
whit member BCCs meeting the constraints provided by the cohesion contract and the 
prudential requirements stated by the vigilance authorities. The reform is expected to have a 
first-round effects after which further adjustments will be developed to reach the goals of 
integration and financial soundness of the group. 
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It is important to consider that each cooperative banking system is characterized by different 
features, linked to cultural values and developments. Because of that, the reform has to be 
implemented step by step considering that every cooperative banking group has a different 
history and operates in a different economic and banking environment. Therefore, there is no 
one-size-fits-all solution and the development of each cooperative banking system varies under 
the influence of historically and contemporary economic and social conditions and it should 
coherently evolve with the development of the territories in which cooperative banks operate. 
A final consideration must be expressed about the wide and complex EU regulation. Indeed, 
the creation of a CBG of large dimensions implies a high level of regulation with high costs of 
compliance risking to penalize the activities of the smallest BCCs that would see themselves 
restricted by too heavy rules. To avoid these negative effects, regulations must be applied in a 
proportional way in order to respect the different business models and different financial 
peculiarities of each member bank. 
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4.3 ANOTHER PROPOSAL OF REFORM 
 
As said before, the formation of a unique large CBG will imply for the holding all the 
difficulties related to the organization and direction of managing a group of more than 300 
BCCs. 
An answer to this issue is coming from the BCE on the example of the American banking 
reforms proposed after the default of the Lehaman Brothers to provide a solution to the issues 
linked to the banks too big to fail. Indeed, the idea that promotes the role of small BCCs over 
those of large banking groups is changing as a banking system based on few large groups 
increases the systemic risk that may bring to negative repercussions for the whole national 
economy.  
Since years, in Europe it has emerged the necessity to have larger financial entities as they are 
thought to lead to greater benefits either in terms of economy either in terms of capital. In fact, 
larger the companies are, more wealth they are able to produce boosting the local economy. 
Also, because of their large capital they are considered to be very solid and therefore able to 
absorb more risks. 
However, the financial crisis has highlighted the high risks related to these large institutions. 
Because of their large dimensions, the default of these financial entities would have drastic 
consequences on the whole economic system, even at global level.  As stated by the President 
of the Federal Reserve of Minneapolis, Neel Kashkari, the only way to avoid future systemic 
crisis is to break into pieces the banks that have become “Too big to fail”. 
‘There cannot be any risk they default’ as the consequences of their failures would deeply affect 
the collectivity. Therefore, especially in the banking sector, it is not sufficient to think only 
about a way to save financial institutions (such us the bail-in) but it has to be evaluated a 
solution to prevent the default of these banks. 
In light of this new American vision, the reform of Italian BCCs is going to the opposite 
direction, risking to unify lots of weak banks under a unique weak group. Because of this 
reason, the BCE is showing its scepticism about unifying all Italian BCCs under a unique 
nation-size CBG, suggesting a different solution that would encourage the formation of more 
CBGs of adequate proportions. 
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Since years the global financial landscape has been divided between the ‘Too big to fail’ and 
‘Too small to succeed’ banking models. But how is it possible to determine what the right size 
of a financial system should be?  
It is important to underline that the purpose of the financial sector should be to serve the real 
economy. Indeed, the size of the financial sector of a country not only affects the level of output 
by allocating productive capital more efficiently but may also contribute to economic growth.  
The size of the banking sector may be defined as the total assets of credit institutions including 
both the domestic assets of local credit institutions and the assets of branches and subsidiaries 
of foreign credit institutions present in a country. 
Among the literature, Goldsmith (1969)68 has empirically shown a positive correlation between 
the size of the financial sector and the long-run economic growth. Moreover, further studies 
have revealed that the relationship between financial development and economic growth is 
influenced by several elements such as financial depth, institutional factors and competitiveness 
of banking systems. As stated by Levine (2005) 69 , a well-developed financial sector is 
beneficial for growth and better developed financial systems ease external financing constraints 
that firms face. However, there might be negative effects when the financial sector becomes too 
large, as it may harm the economy and the society as a whole bringing to a misallocation of 
resources and to deep crisis (Arcand, Berkes and Panizza, 2012)70. Therefore, through the years, 
several studies have tried to understand whether there is a threshold above which financial 
development no longer has a positive effect on economic growth and it has emerged that 
different countries have different thresholds.  
In particular two main views emerge about the size of the banking system. The first point of 
view argues that the size of the banking sector should be related to the capacity of the country. 
This means that the size of the financial sector should not be too large compared to the size of 
the country, this in turn implies that small countries cannot have large banking sectors. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that large banks are more dangerous than small banks 
as this aspect depends on the riskiness of their assets (Dermine and Schoenmaker, 2010)71.  
Instead, the second vision is based on the ‘follow-the-client’ principle, in accordance to which 
                                                             
68 Goldsmith R. (1969), Financial structure and development. 
69 Levine R. (2005), Finance and growth: theory and evidence. 
70 Arcand, Berkes and Panizza (2012), Too much finance? IMF. 
71 Dermine and Schoenmaker (2010), In banking, is small beautiful? 
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the banking sector should support its clients (Grosse and Goldberg, 1991)72 and therefore the 
size of the banking sector should be in line with the financial needs of households and firms. 
Another consideration must be done about the financial needs of a country, indeed as banks are 
thought to serve the real economy, socio-economic trends determine credit composition within 
a nation. From the study of Beck, Büyükkarabacak, Rioja and Valvev (2008)73, it has been 
shown that only banks lending to enterprises have a positive and significant impact on economic 
growth. As countries differ in their financial needs, and especially with regard to loans provided 
to non-financial entities, it may be possible that countries with a larger private sector also have 
larger banks as banks finance both industry and trade. 
In light of the analysed literature, it seems clear that the development of a banking system is 
strictly related to the development of the private sector. As regards the Italian situation, its 
productive structure appears to be very fragmented, characterized by more than 4 million of 
small-medium companies. This fragmented structure is reflected by the Italian banking sector, 
especially by the cooperative financial sector because of its territorial feature. Therefore, it is 
evident that the Italian financial network cannot be formed by large banks but it is important to 
respect the dimensions of the local enterprises. This is an important aspect that has to be taken 
into consideration also for the development of the BCCs reform. The formation of a unique 
large CBG may do not be adequate to the characteristics of the Italian economic structure that 
instead is more linked to small local financial institutions able to protect and develop the local 
territory. Therefore, as final consideration it might be said that the formation of a unique CBG 
does not seem to be appropriate to the Italian cooperative sector. First of all, as this model may 
bring the unique CBG to incur into the risks related to large institutions, also including the so 
called systemic risk exposing the whole national economy to high risks of financial crisis. 
Because of this reason, even the BCE seems to discourage the unique CBG in favour of the 
formation of more groups that would allow to better develop management and control functions 
and to mitigate the effects of possible financial distresses on the national economy.  Secondly, 
a nation-size CBG is considered to imply high challenges at direction and coordination level 
and to do not match the textile of the Italian economic sector. This aspect may bring to a loss 
of efficiency and to high costs for the whole system, also threatening the mutual principles and 
the territorial links representing the foundations of the cooperative financial sector. 
                                                             
72 Grosse and Goldberg (1991), What is the appropriate size of the banking system? 
73 Beck, Büyükkarabacak, Rioja and Valvev (2008), Who gets the credit? And does it matter?, Georgia State 
University. 
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4.4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF ITALIAN BCCs 
  
The global financial crisis has deeply changed the financial world in which banks operate. The 
main drivers of this change are represented by the reform of the financial regulations taken 
always more at supranational level and by the technological progress. After the financial crisis, 
the aim of the G20 has been to increase the soundness of banks by increasing their disposal of 
capital of better quality. While the technological aspect is regarding mainly the development of 
methods of payments and services online, the financial regulation’s goal is to increase banks’ 
capacity to resist to external shocks ensuring the stability of the national financial systems.  
We have seen that in Italy the financial institutions strongly weakened by the international 
financial troubles have been the BCCs that are therefore object of a current reform that aims to 
make their structure more suitable to operate in the current financial conditions.  
As final considerations, it could be said that the key element of the BCCs reform is represented 
by the reorganization of the governance. An effective reform should enforce the cooperative 
governance framework while preserving the characteristics that identify cooperative banks 
making their existence essential for the national territory. As seen in the previous chapters, 
cooperative banks were created to provide financial services to market segments in the local 
community that otherwise would have had not been able to access credit. Thus, BCCs’ business 
model is based on relationship banking and strong territorial orientation.  
To sum up, the Italian cooperative sector is currently evaluating the optimal implementation of 
the reform. At the moment, the formation of two CBGs seems to prevail on the formation of 
the unique group. However, a further suggestion of the BCE is proposing the creation of more 
CBGs. 
As analysed previously, a large group would allow to spread the risk among a higher number 
of members, giving the perception of a sounder network. However, such large dimensions are 
likely to imply a high risk of “moral hazard” as the perception that creditors of large banks will 
not be involved by possible financial distresses lowers the cost of capital and encourages 
managers to engage in risky activities. Secondly, large groups are likely to be complex, non-
transparent and difficult to understand and control for outsiders (or even insiders) and they 
would also imply the need of systemic risk-based regulations. Therefore, I think the formation 
of a unique group would bring to the creation a very complex entity, very difficult to manage 
and control. This complexity would be increased by the characteristics of the Italian cooperative 
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sector that, as based on small-medium banks, has never experienced before the direction of 
entities of such dimensions. 
Regarding the formation of a possible second group, I think that if it will be developed as 
proposed by CCB, including around 91 BCCs it may have adequate dimensions to provide 
efficient services to member BCCs and to get enough financial resources in the capital markets.  
Furthermore, including a lower number of BCCs, the activities of direction and coordination 
may be better developed also in terms of internal controls. Even with regard to the risk 
management, the number of member entities (selected on their rating score) seems to be large 
enough to support financial risks without compromising the financial soundness of member 
BCCs. However, the final financial landscape would be represented by two non-proportional 
CBGs (one including around 91 BCCs and another one with more than 200 members) leading 
to further issues of vigilance and supervision of the sector.  
In my opinion, I would say the vision of the BCE seems to be the most appropriate proposal. I 
think BCCs reform should aim to form more banking groups of similar dimensions in terms of 
total assets. The groups’ dimensions should be adequate to ensure the soundness of the member 
institutions and of the whole cooperative credit system at the same time without exposing the 
whole sector to systemic risks. Moreover, sounder and weaker BCCs should be spread equally 
among the groups, thus creating homogeneous CBGs so that the weaknesses of less stable BCCs 
may be balanced by the strong ones but without compromising their health. Therefore, the 
composition of the membership of each group should be regulated by the Bank of Italy on the 
base of the rating score of each institutions in order to ensure the formation of balanced groups. 
Otherwise, the free aggregation of BCCs may lead to the risk of creating sound groups of strong 
financial institutions leaving outside the weaker banks that therefore would form weak networks 
losing the purpose of the reform. 
I think that an optimal proposal may be to create from three to four CBGs. The creation of more 
groups of similar dimensions among each other and of similar ratings would allow to overcome 
the difficulties related to the large dimensions of the unique group and also to take a first step 
toward the direction of the consolidation of BCCs. As this represents an unknown territory for 
the Italian cooperative credit, I think the reform should be developed gradually to do not make   
the Italian cooperative sector to pass from a fragmented weak structure to the complex 
management of a nation-size group. In this way a first-round effects may be assessed on the 
base of which adjustments and further regulations may be provided improving step by step the 
groups’ functions and structures.  
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As regards the risk management, in this case the financial risk would be spread among a lower 
number of BCCs. However, the holding of each group would dispose of 1 billion euro and it 
would have access to capital markets, therefore each group would have the possibility to raise 
fresh financial resources in case of necessity. The dimensions of the groups would be not too 
large so that it may allow to develop efficient controls and at the same time large enough to 
ensure the soundness of the network without incurring in systemic risks. Indeed, this structure 
would allow to mitigate the effects of the financial distress or default of a group on the whole 
national economy.  
To conclude, I would say that this reform represents an important evolution of the cooperative 
sector that allows Italian BCCs to increase their soundness and their competitiveness. As all the 
possible developments of the reform are still under discussion, we cannot be completely sure 
about the final effects of the reform but relevant benefits are likely to be reached. For sure, the 
most key aspect regards the improvement of the governance and the well regulation of the 
cohesion contract that will have to include all the mutual and financial principles of the new 
cooperative banking groups to ensure the well-functioning of the Italian cooperative system. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The deep financial crisis of 2008 is considered to be the main cause of uncertainty and loss of 
trust within the cooperative banking system that has brought to an increase in the cost of capital 
and to the instability of the financial mutual system. The crisis has modified the context as well 
as the relationships network in which cooperative banks operate. Because of their self-financing 
mechanisms and their strong presence at local level, these institutions seem to be no more 
suitable to survive and compete in an always more complex financial scenario. 
In this thesis, I have analysed the reform of the Italian BCCs thought to reorganize the Italian 
mutual sector to overtake its structural limits. In particular, the goal of the reform is to improve 
the access to funding resources and to allow an adequate diversification level lowering 
BCCs’exposure to financial risks. 
In the first chapter we have seen that the Law 14th February 2016, n.18, TUB introduces in the 
Italian mutual banking system the model of the Cooperative Banking Group, which pillars are 
represented by the figure of the holding company, the formation of the cohesion contract and 
the establishment of a cross-guarantee system. Through this new structure, the reform aims to 
enforce member BCCs increasing their access to capital markets and providing a sound 
guarantee mechanism allowing a fast flow of financial resources throughout the institutions part 
of the group. 
In the second chapter, the models of the mutual banking groups Crédit Agricole and Rabobank 
have been analysed. The main emerged characteristics regard their high-integrated networks 
based on internal cross-guarantee systems and the roles of the public central holdings that 
coordinate member banks, ensure a fast access to financial resources and provide an efficient 
control over the whole group. Because of their sharp growth and their large dimensions, these 
financial institutions are considered to be the main Cooperative Banking Groups in Europe, 
representing great examples for the possible development of the Italian BCCs reform. 
In the third chapter, we have seen that a guide for the formation of the cohesion contract may 
be represented by the financial principles and capital thresholds provided by other financial 
institutions such as the FITD, rating agencies and by those included in the EBA’s banks 
recovery plans. In accordance with the developed analysis, the CBG’s financial profile should 
be based on financial indicators thought to monitor the capital adequacy, liquidity and 
profitability together with efficient risk assessment procedures of each member BCC in order 
to timely detect financial threats and provide prompt interventions to safeguard the financial 
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stability of the whole group. Among the other, the most relevant financial ratios are the Tier 1 
capital ratio, the Tier 1 leverage ratio, the Return on Assets ratio together with the ICAAP 
indicator and the risk measurement methodology RAF. It is important to say that financial and 
risk assessment procedures have to be homogeneously and correctly developed within the group 
to satisfy the principle of prudent and healthy management of the CBG. In light of this principle, 
great relevance is given to the role of the cohesion contract that must adequately regulate the 
holding’s direction and coordination functions together with the development of efficient 
internal controls to guarantee the well-functioning of the whole organization. Furthermore, the 
reform has to ensure the respect of BCCs’ mutual nature safeguarding their territorial links and 
their role to serve and boost local economies.  
In the fourth chapter instead we have considered the possible ways of the reform development. 
We have seen that the initial proposal of reform aimed to unify the Italian BCCs in a unique 
banking group under the direction of Iccrea holding. However, from the recent news, it seems 
likely that the reform will bring to the formation of a second CBG run by Cassa Centrale Banca 
and of a further provincial group run by Cassa Raiffeisen. In addition, another proposal of the 
BCE seems to take place into the financial scenario, suggesting the formation of two or more 
CBGs in order to protect the national economy from possible systemic risks that would 
dramatically affect the whole Italian economy. From the analysis of these possibilities, it could 
be said that this reform may lead to significant benefits for the Italian mutual banking sector 
increasing the reliability and financial soundness of BCCs boosting a possible growth of the 
mutual sector itself and of local economies. The final effects of the reform are not observable 
yet, however in my opinion the optimal solution may be to create more than two CBGs, in 
accordance with the proposal of the BCE. Indeed, the formation of three or four groups would 
ease the development of the holding’s functions and therefore it would guarantee a better 
management of the member BCCs ensuring the protection of the mutual principles.  
In conclusion, it could be said that in light of this reform, the role of BCCs may be considerably 
enforced and their local presence would be strengthen by an increase of reliability and clients’ 
trust. However, all these benefits may be reached only through an efficient development of the 
reform, providing all the necessary measures and regulations to guarantee the protection and 
the well-working of such important financial institutions in our financial system.  
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